FREE SPEECH COALITION v. PAXTON
Supreme Court Cases
Opinions
Majority Opinion Author
Clarence Thomas
Majority Participants
Dissenting Participants
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC., ET AL. v. PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
No. 23鈥1122. Argued January 15, 2025 鈥 Decided June 27, 2025
Texas, like many States, prohibits distributing sexually explicit content to children. In 2023, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, requiring certain commercial websites publishing sexually explicit content that is obscene to minors to verify that visitors are 18 or older. Knowing violations subject covered entities to injunctions and civil penalties.
Petitioners 鈥 representatives of the pornography industry 鈥 sued the Texas attorney general to enjoin enforcement of H. B. 1181 as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment鈥檚 Free Speech Clause. They alleged that adults have a right to access the covered speech, and that the statute impermissibly hinders them. The Fifth Circuit held that an injunction was not warranted because petitioners were unlikely to succeed on their First Amendment claim. The court viewed H. B. 1181 as a 鈥渞egulatio[n] of the distribution to minors of materials obscene for minors.鈥 95 F. 4th 263, 269, 271. It therefore determined that the law is not subject to any heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.
Held: H. B. 1181 triggers, and survives, review under intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens the protected speech of adults. Pp. 5鈥36.
(a) H. B. 1181 is subject to intermediate scrutiny. Pp. 5鈥32.
(1) To determine whether a law that regulates speech violates the First Amendment, the Court considers both the nature of the burden imposed by the law and the nature of the speech at issue. Laws that target protected speech 鈥渂ased on its communicative content鈥 are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if 鈥 they satisfy strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 163. Laws that only incidentally burden protected speech are subject to intermediate scrutiny. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642. And laws that restrict only unprotected speech, such as obscenity, receive rational-basis review. United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468. History, tradition, and precedent establish that sexual content that is obscene to minors but not to adults is protected in part and unprotected in part. States may prevent minors from accessing such content, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 637鈥638, but may not prevent adults from doing the same, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383. Pp. 6鈥13.
(2) H. B. 1181 has only an incidental effect on protected speech, and is therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny. The First Amendment leaves undisturbed States鈥 traditional power to prevent minors from accessing speech that is obscene from their perspective. That power includes the power to require proof of age before an individual can access such speech. It follows that no person 鈥 adult or child 鈥 has a First Amendment right to access such speech without first submitting proof of age.
The power to verify age is part of the power to prevent children from accessing speech that is obscene to them. Where the Constitution reserves a power to the States, that power includes 鈥渢he ordinary and appropriate means鈥 of exercising it.[1] J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 搂430, pp. 412鈥413. Requiring proof of age is an ordinary and appropriate means of enforcing an age-based limit on obscenity to minors. Age verification is common when laws draw age-based lines, e.g., obtaining alcohol, a firearm, or a driver鈥檚 license. Obscenity is no exception. Most States require age verification for in-person purchases of sexual material, and petitioners concede that in-person requirements of this kind are 鈥渢raditional鈥 and 鈥渁lmost surely鈥 constitutional. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. And as a practical matter, age-verification is necessary for an effective prohibition on minors accessing age-inappropriate sexual content, especially on the internet.
Because H. B. 1181 simply requires proof of age to access content that is obscene to minors, it does not directly regulate adults鈥 protected speech. Adults have the right to access speech obscene only to minors, see Butler, 352 U. S., at 383鈥384, and submitting to age verification burdens the exercise of that right. But adults have no First Amendment right to avoid age verification. Any burden on adults is therefore incidental to regulating activity not protected by the First Amendment. This makes intermediate scrutiny the appropriate standard under the Court鈥檚 precedents. Pp. 13鈥19.
(3) Applying the more demanding standard of strict scrutiny would call into question all age-verification requirements, even longstanding in-person requirements. Although petitioners insist that traditional in-person requirements would survive strict scrutiny, the Court cannot share their confidence. Strict scrutiny is designed to enforce the First Amendment鈥檚 prohibition on content-based laws, and it succeeds in that purpose only if, as a practical matter, it is almost always fatal in fact. Strict scrutiny is not the appropriate standard for laws that are traditional and widely accepted as legitimate. Pp. 19鈥 21.
(4) Precedent does not call for the application of strict scrutiny. The Court鈥檚 decisions applying strict scrutiny in this context all involved laws that banned both minors and adults from accessing speech that was at most obscene only to minors. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 118, 126; United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 808, 811, 814; Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 868, 876; Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656, 665. The Court has never before considered whether the more modest burden of an age-verification requirement triggers strict scrutiny. Pp. 21鈥28.
(5) Texas contends that only rational-basis review applies. This position fails to account for the incidental burden that age verification necessarily has on an adult鈥檚 First Amendment right to access speech obscene only to minors. Although deferential, intermediate scrutiny plays an important role in ensuring that legislatures do not use ostensibly legitimate purposes to disguise efforts to suppress fundamental rights. Pp. 31鈥32.
(b) H. B. 1181 survives intermediate scrutiny because it 鈥渁dvances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U. S. 180, 189. Pp. 32鈥36.
(1) H. B. 1181 furthers Texas鈥檚 important interest in shielding children from sexual content and is adequately tailored to that interest. States have long used age-verification requirements to reconcile their interest in protecting children from sexual material with adults鈥 right to avail themselves of such material. H. B. 1181 simply adapts this traditional approach to the digital age. The specific verification methods that H. B. 1181 permits 鈥 government-issued identification and transactional data 鈥 are also plainly legitimate. Both are established methods of verifying age already in use by many pornographic websites and other industries with age-restricted services. Pp. 32鈥34.
(2) Petitioners鈥 counterarguments are unpersuasive. Petitioners object that other means of protecting children are more effective and that children are likely to encounter sexually explicit content on other websites subject to H. B. 1181鈥檚 requirements. But intermediate scrutiny does not require States to adopt the least restrictive means of pursuing their interests, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 800, or avoid all under-inclusiveness, TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U. S. , . Pp. 34鈥35. 95 F. 4th 263, affirmed.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 23鈥1122
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FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
[June 27, 2025]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. Texas, like many States, prohibits the distribution of sexually explicit content to children. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 搂43.24(b) (West 2016). But, although that prohibition may be effective against brick-and-mortar stores, it has proved challenging to enforce against online content. In an effort to address this problem, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 搂129B.001 et seq. (West Cum. Supp. 2024), which requires certain commercial websites that publish sexually explicit content to verify the ages of their visitors. This requirement furthers the lawful end of preventing children from accessing sexually explicit content. But, it also burdens adult visitors of these websites, who all agree have a First Amendment right to access at least some of the content that the websites publish. We granted certiorari to decide whether these burdens likely render H. B. 1181 unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. We hold that they do not. The power to require age verification is within a State鈥檚 authority to prevent children from accessing sexually explicit content. H. B. 1181 is a constitutionally permissible exercise of that authority.
I
A
In 2023, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, a law requiring pornographic websites to verify that their users are adults. H. B. 1181鈥檚 sponsors proposed the law to address their concern that the internet makes too accessible to minors 鈥渉ardcore pornographic content and videos,鈥 many of which depict 鈥渟exual violence, incest, physical aggression, sexual assault, non-consent, and teens.鈥 App. 254鈥255. According to the sponsors, such pornography is 鈥渁ddictive,鈥 has harmful 鈥渄evelopmental effects on the brain,鈥 and leads to 鈥渞isky sexual behaviors.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ibid. The Texas Legislature passed the Act with only a single opposing vote, and the Governor signed it into law.
The statute applies to any 鈥渃ommercial entity that knowingly and intentionally publishes or distributes material on an Internet website, . . . more than one-third of which is sexual material harmful to minors.鈥 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 搂129B.002(a). The statute defines 鈥溾榌s]exual material harmful to minors鈥欌 as material that: (1) 鈥渋s designed to appeal to or pander to the prurient interest鈥 when taken 鈥渁s a whole and with respect to minors鈥; (2) describes, displays, or depicts 鈥渋n a manner patently offensive with respect to minors鈥 various sex acts and portions of the human anatomy, including depictions of 鈥渟exual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation, [and] excretory functions鈥; and (3) 鈥渓acks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.鈥 搂129B.001(6).
H. B. 1181 requires a covered entity to 鈥渦se reasonable age verification methods . . . to verify that an individual attempting to access the material is 18 years of age or older.鈥 搂129B.002(a). To verify age, a covered entity must require visitors to 鈥渃omply with a commercial age verification system鈥 that uses 鈥済overnment-issued identification鈥 or 鈥渁 commercially reasonable method that relies on public or private transactional data.鈥 搂129B.003(b)(2).[1] The entity may perform verification itself or through a third-party service. 搂129B.003(b).
If a commercial entity knowingly violates H. B. 1181, the Texas attorney general may sue to enjoin the violation. 搂129B.006(a). The attorney general may also recover a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per day that the website is noncompliant, as well as an additional penalty of up to $250,000 if any minors access covered sexual material as a result of the violation. 搂129B.006(b).
H. B. 1181 is not the only law of its kind. At least 21 other States have imposed materially similar age-verification requirements to access sexual material that is harmful to minors online.[2]
B
Soon after Texas enacted H. B. 1181, a trade association for the pornography industry, a group of companies that operate pornographic websites, and a pornography performer sued the Texas attorney general. These plaintiffs, petitioners here, sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute as facially unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. They alleged that adults have a right to access the speech covered by H. B. 1181, and that the statute impermissibly hinders them from doing so.
The District Court granted petitioners a preliminary injunction after concluding that they were likely to succeed on their claim. The court held that because H. B. 1181 鈥渞estricts access to speech鈥 that is constitutionally protected for adults 鈥渂ased on the material鈥檚 content,鈥 it is subject to 鈥渟trict scrutiny鈥 鈥 the onerous standard of scrutiny applicable to direct invasions of First Amendment rights. Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Colmenero, 689 F. Supp. 3d 373, 391 (WD Tex. 2023). Under that standard, the law would be constitutional only if Texas could show that it 鈥(1) serve[s] a compelling governmental interest, (2) [is] narrowly tailored to achieve it, and (3) [is] the least restrictive means of advancing it.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 392. The District Court acknowledged Texas鈥檚 compelling interest in preventing 鈥渁 minor鈥檚 access to pornography.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ibid. But, it found that Texas had failed to 鈥渟how that H. B. 1181 is narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means of advancing that interest.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 393. In the District Court鈥檚 opinion, for example, encouraging parents to install content-filtering software on their children鈥檚 devices would be a less restrictive means of accomplishing the State鈥檚 objective. Id., at 401鈥404.
The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction, holding that petitioners were unlikely to succeed on the merits. The Fifth Circuit viewed H. B. 1181 as a 鈥渞egulatio[n] of the distribution to minors of materials obscene for minors,鈥 which only incidentally implicates 鈥渢he privacy of those adults鈥 seeking to access the regulated content. 95 F. 4th 263, 269, 271 (2024). And, because minors have no First Amendment right to access such materials, the court held that the law was 鈥渟ubject only to rational basis review鈥 鈥 the exceedingly deferential standard applicable to laws that do not implicate fundamental rights. Id., at 269. Applying that standard, the court concluded that H. B. 1181 survived petitioners鈥 challenge because its 鈥渁ge verification requirement is rationally related to the government鈥檚 legitimate interest in preventing minors鈥 access to pornography.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 267.
Judge Higginbotham dissented in relevant part. Like the District Court, he would have applied strict scrutiny and found that Texas had failed to meet its burden under that standard. Id., at 299, 303鈥304 (opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Petitioners sought a stay of the Fifth Circuit鈥檚 judgment, which this Court denied. 601 U. S. (2024). We granted certiorari to determine whether H. B. 1181鈥檚 age verification requirement is likely constitutional on its face. 603 U. S. (2024).
II
To determine which standard of First Amendment scrutiny applies to Texas鈥檚 age-verification law, we must first review some background principles about the First Amendment. Specifically, we must focus on what the First Amendment generally protects, the extent to which it permits States to restrict minors鈥 access to sexually explicit speech, and how this Court has addressed earlier laws that aimed to prevent children from viewing sexually explicit speech online.
A
The First Amendment, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws 鈥渁bridging the freedom of speech.鈥 As 鈥渁 general matter,鈥 this provision 鈥渕eans that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U. S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, this principle 鈥渋s not absolute.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ibid. To determine whether a law that regulates speech violates the First Amendment, we must consider both the nature of the burden imposed by the law and the nature of the speech at issue. Our precedents distinguish between two types of restrictions on protected speech: content-based laws and content-neutral laws. 鈥淐ontent-based laws 鈥 those that target speech based on its communicative content 鈥 are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if 鈥 they satisfy strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 163 (2015). That standard requires that a law be 鈥渢he least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.鈥&苍产蝉辫;McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U. S. 464, 478 (2014).
Content-neutral laws, on the other hand, 鈥渁re subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642 (1994) (citation omitted). Under that standard, a law will survive review 鈥渋f it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U. S. 180, 189 (1997) (Turner II ).
At the same time, not all speech is protected. 鈥 鈥楩rom 1791 to the present,鈥 鈥 certain 鈥 鈥榟istoric and traditional categories鈥欌 of speech 鈥 such as 鈥渙bscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct鈥 鈥 have been understood to fall outside the scope of the First Amendment. United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468 (2010) (citations omitted). States generally may prohibit speech of this kind without 鈥渞ais[ing] any Constitutional problem.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571鈥572 (1942). Such prohibitions are subject only to rational-basis review, the minimum constitutional standard that all legislation must satisfy. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 628, n. 27 (2008). Under that standard, a law will be upheld 鈥渋f there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis鈥 for its enactment. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 313 (1993).
B
History, tradition, and precedent recognize that States have two distinct powers to address obscenity: They may proscribe outright speech that is obscene to the public at large, and they may prevent children from accessing speech that is obscene to children.
By the 18th century, English common law recognized publishing obscenity as an indictable offense. See Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (K. B. 1770); Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange 789, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K. B. 1727). So too did early American decisions. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336, 336鈥337 (1821); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91, 100鈥102 (Pa. 1815); Knowles v. State, 3 Day 103, 108 (Conn. 1808). By the end of the Civil War, most States had prohibited obscenity by statute, and Congress had prohibited sending obscene materials by mail. See An Act Relating to the Postal Laws 搂16, 13 Stat. 507; E. Hovey, Stamping Out Smut: The Enforcement of Obscenity Laws, 1872鈥1915, p. 36 (1998). And, from the late 19th century onward, this Court has consistently recognized the government鈥檚 power to proscribe obscenity. See, e.g., Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U. S. 66, 77 (2023); Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 483 (1957); Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 42鈥43 (1896).
Our precedents hold that speech is obscene to the public at large 鈥 and thus proscribable 鈥 if (a) 鈥渢he average person, applying contemporary community standards[,] would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest鈥; (b) 鈥渢he work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law鈥; and (c) 鈥渢he work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our precedents refer to this standard as 鈥渢he Miller 迟别蝉迟.鈥
Miller does not define the totality of States鈥 power to regulate sexually explicit speech, however. In addition to their general interest in protecting the public at large, States have a specific interest in protecting children from sexually explicit speech. The earliest obscenity decisions recognized that restricting obscenity served two distinct interests 鈥 curbing the 鈥渃orruption of the public mind in general,鈥 and protecting 鈥渢he manners of youth in particular.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Sharpless, 2 Serge & Rawle, at 103 (opinion of Yeates, J.); see also Holmes, 17 Mass., at 336鈥337 (upholding an indictment for publishing an obscene book tending to 鈥 鈥榯he manifest corruption and subversion of the youth and other good citizens of [this] Commonwealth鈥 鈥). Similarly, many early obscenity statutes targeted for special regulation works 鈥渕anifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth.鈥&苍产蝉辫;E.g., Me. Rev. Stat., ch. 160, 搂19 (1840); Mass. Rev. Stat. ch. 130, 搂10 (1836); Mich. Rev. Stat., Pt. 4, Tit. 1, ch. 8, 搂10 (1838); 1838 Terr. of Wis. Stat. 搂10, p. 366; Vt. Rev. Stat., ch. 99, 搂10 (1840). This trend continued through the time of the Fourteenth Amendment鈥檚 ratification, with States routinely enforcing statutes that punished indecent publications on the ground that they corrupted 鈥渢he morals of youth.鈥&苍产蝉辫;E.g., Fuller v. People, 92 Ill. 182, 184 (1879); Commonwealth v. Dejardin, 126 Mass. 46, 46鈥47 (1878); Barker v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. 412, 413 (1852); State v. Hanson, 23 Tex. 233, 233鈥234 (1859).
Consistent with this history, our precedents recognize that States can impose greater limits on children鈥檚 access to sexually explicit speech than they can on adults鈥 access. When regulating adult access, a State must define obscenity from the perspective of 鈥渢he average鈥 adult, Roth, 354 U. S., at 489, and so may not prohibit adults from accessing speech that is inappropriate only for children, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957). Minors, however, have long been thought to be more susceptible to the harmful effects of sexually explicit content, and less able to appreciate the role it might play within a larger expressive work. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 641鈥643 (1968); United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1105 (No. 14,571) (CC SDNY 1879). They therefore possess 鈥渁 more restricted right . . . to judge and determine for themselves what sex material they may read or see.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 637. When regulating minors鈥 access to sexual content, the State may broaden Miller鈥檚 鈥渄efinition of obscenity鈥 to cover that which is obscene from a child鈥檚 perspective. Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 638. To be more precise, a State may prevent minors from accessing works that (a) taken as a whole, and under contemporary community standards, appeal to the prurient interest of minors; (b) depict or describe specifically defined sexual conduct in a way that is patently offensive for minors; and (c) taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. See Miller, 413 U. S., at 24; Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 635, 638.[3] Restrictions of this kind trigger no heightened First Amendment scrutiny and are subject only to rational-basis review, even though they encompass speech that is 鈥渘ot obscene for adults.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 634, 639.
In sum, two basic principles govern legislation aimed at shielding children from sexually explicit content. A State may not prohibit adults from accessing content that is obscene only to minors. Butler, 352 U. S., at 383. But, it may enact laws to prevent minors from accessing such content. Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 637鈥638.
C
This Court has applied these principles to regulations of internet-based speech on two prior occasions, both at the dawn of the internet age. First, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844 (1997), we addressed the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 110 Stat. 133. The CDA criminalized using the internet to knowingly transmit 鈥渙bscene or indecent messages鈥 to a minor, or to knowingly send or display 鈥減atently offensive messages in a manner that is available to鈥 a minor. 521 U. S., at 859鈥860. It provided an affirmative defense to 鈥渢hose who restrict access to covered material by requiring certain designated forms of age proof.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 860鈥861.
We held that the CDA violated the First Amendment because it 鈥渆ffectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 874. The CDA鈥檚 age-verification defense was illusory because, in many cases, 鈥渆xisting technology did not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access to its communications on the Internet without also denying access to adults.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 876.[4] And, even as to minors, the CDA swept far beyond obscenity. Fairly read, the terms 鈥溾榠ndecent鈥 鈥 and 鈥 鈥榩atently offensive鈥欌 encompassed 鈥渓arge amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or other value.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 877. The Act was thus a 鈥渃ontent-based restriction鈥 of protected speech that could not survive strict scrutiny. Id., at 879.
After Reno, Congress passed the Children鈥檚 Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPA), 112 Stat. 2681鈥728, which we addressed in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656 (2004) (Ashcroft II ). COPA criminalized posting 鈥渃ontent that is 鈥榟armful to minors鈥 鈥 online for 鈥 鈥榗ommercial purposes.鈥欌 Id., at 661 (quoting 47 U. S. C. 搂231(a)(1)). The Act defined such content as material that is obscene under the Miller test, as adjusted to minors. 542 U. S., at 661鈥662 (citing 搂231(e)(6)). It also provided 鈥渁n affirmative defense to those who employ specified means to prevent minors from gaining access to the prohibited materials on their Web site,鈥 such as requiring the use of a credit card or a digital certificate that verifies age. Id., at 662 (citing 搂231(c)(1)). Soon after COPA鈥檚 passage, a District Court preliminarily enjoined its enforcement, holding that the Act likely violated the First Amendment. Id., at 663.
This Court held that the injunction was not an abuse of discretion. Id., at 664鈥665. The parties agreed that COPA was subject to strict scrutiny. So too did this Court, which briefly noted that this was so because COPA 鈥 鈥榚ffectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.鈥欌 Id., at 665 (quoting Reno, 521 U. S., at 874). We then focused our analysis on whether the Government had shown that it was likely to satisfy its burden under strict scrutiny. 542 U. S., at 666鈥670. We held that it had not, because the Government had not ruled out that it could protect children just as well through the less restrictive means of encouraging parents to install blocking and filtering software on their computers. Ibid. We also noted that age verification was 鈥渙nly an affirmative defense,鈥 meaning that even speakers adopting an approved verification method might be forced to 鈥渞isk the perils of trial.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 670鈥671; accord, id., at 674 (Stevens, J., concurring). And, we leaned heavily on the abuse-of-discretion standard, observing that 鈥渟ubstantial factual disputes remain[ed] in the case,鈥 and that 鈥渢he factual record does not reflect current technological reality鈥 because it was 鈥渙ver five years鈥 old. Id., at 671 (majority opinion).
For the past two decades, Ashcroft II has been our last word on the government鈥檚 power to protect children from sexually explicit content online. During this period, the 鈥渢echnology of the Internet鈥 has continued to 鈥渆volv[e] at a rapid pace.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ibid. With the rise of the smartphone and instant streaming, many adolescents can now access vast libraries of video content 鈥 both benign and obscene 鈥 at almost any time and place, with an ease that would have been unimaginable at the time of Reno and Ashcroft II.
III
With that background in mind, we turn now to the level of scrutiny that applies to H. B. 1181. Petitioners contend that the law must survive strict scrutiny because it imposes a content-based regulation on protected speech. The State, on the other hand, argues that the statute is subject only to rational-basis review because it does not burden any protected speech. We think neither party has it right. Applying our precedents, we hold that intermediate scrutiny applies.
A
H. B. 1181 is an exercise of Texas鈥檚 traditional power to prevent minors from accessing speech that is obscene from their perspective. To the extent that it burdens adults鈥 rights to access such speech, it has 鈥渙nly an incidental effect on protected speech,鈥 making it subject to intermediate scrutiny. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 659 (2000).
1
Age-verification laws like H. B. 1181 fall within States鈥 authority to shield children from sexually explicit content. The First Amendment leaves undisturbed States鈥 traditional power to prevent minors from accessing speech that is obscene from their perspective. Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 641. That power necessarily includes the power to require proof of age before an individual can access such speech. It follows that no person 鈥 adult or child 鈥 has a First Amendment right to access speech that is obscene to minors without first submitting proof of age.
The power to verify age is a necessary component of the power to prevent children鈥檚 access to content that is obscene from their perspective. 鈥淣o axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that . . . wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included.鈥 The Federalist No. 44, p. 285 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison); accord, T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 63 (1868); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 192鈥193 (2012). Hence, where the Constitution reserves a power to the States, it also reserves 鈥渢he ordinary and appropriate means鈥 of exercising that power. 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 搂430, pp. 412鈥413 (1833). For example, in the Eighth Amendment context we have explained that, because 鈥渃apital punishment is constitutional, . . . 鈥榯here must be a constitutional means of carrying it out.鈥欌 Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. 863, 869 (2015) (alteration omitted). Similarly, because the First Amendment permits States to prohibit minors from accessing speech that is obscene to them, it likewise permits States to employ the ordinary and appropriate means of enforcing such a prohibition. Requiring proof of age to access that speech is one such means. Requiring age verification is common when a law draws lines based on age. For example, Texas, like many States, requires proof of age to obtain alcohol, Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann. 搂106.03(b) (2020); tobacco, Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 搂搂161.082(d), (e) (Cum. Supp. 2024); a lottery ticket;[5] a tattoo, 25 Tex. Admin. Code 搂搂229.406(a), (b) (2024); a body piercing, ibid.; fireworks, Tex. Occ. Code Ann. 搂2154.252(c) (2019); and a driver鈥檚 license, Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 搂521.142(a) (2018). Federal law similarly mandates age verification to obtain certain medications from a pharmacist, 21 CFR 搂搂1306.26(c), (d) (2024), or to obtain employment as a minor, 29 CFR 搂570.5 (2024). Fundamental rights that turn on age are no different. Texas, again like many States, requires proof of age to obtain a handgun license, Tex. Govt. Code Ann. 搂411.174(a)(3) (2019); to register to vote, Tex. Elec. Code Ann. 搂搂13.002(c)(2), (8) (2020); and to marry, Tex. Fam. Code 搂2.005(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024). In none of these contexts is the constitutionality of a reasonable, bona fide age-verification requirement disputed. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 38鈥39, n. 9 (2022); Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U. S. 181, 202鈥203 (2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386鈥387 (1978).
Obscenity is no exception to the widespread practice of requiring proof of age to exercise age-restricted rights. The New York statute upheld in Ginsberg required age verification: It permitted a seller who sold sexual material to a minor to raise 鈥 鈥榟onest mistake鈥欌 as to age as an affirmative defense, but only if the seller had made 鈥 鈥榓 reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of [the] minor.鈥欌 390 U. S., at 644. Most States to this day also require age verification for in-person purchases of sexual material.[6] And, petitioners concede that an in-person age verification requirement is a 鈥渢raditional sort of law鈥 that is 鈥渁lmost surely鈥 constitutional. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17.
The facts of Ginsberg illustrate why age verification, as a practical matter, is necessary for an effective prohibition on minors accessing age-inappropriate sexual content. The statute in that case prohibited the knowing sale of sexual content to a minor under the age of 17. 390 U. S., at 633. The defendant was convicted of knowingly selling a pornographic magazine to a 16-year-old. Id., at 631. But, most of the time, it is almost impossible to distinguish a 16-year-old from a 17-year-old by sight alone. Thus, had the seller in Ginsberg not had an obligation to verify the age of the purchaser, he likely could have avoided liability simply by asserting ignorance as to the purchaser鈥檚 age. Only an ageverification requirement can ensure compliance with an age-based restriction.
The need for age verification online is even greater. Unlike a store clerk, a website operator cannot look at its visitors and estimate their ages. Without a requirement to submit proof of age, even clearly underage minors would be able to access sexual content undetected. 鈥溾榌T]he basic principles of freedom of speech . . . do not vary鈥 when a new and different medium for communication appears.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 564 U. S. 786, 790 (2011); accord, Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U. S. 707, 733 (2024). Because proof of age performs the same critical function online that it does in person, requiring age verification remains an ordinary and appropriate means of shielding minors in the digital age from material that is obscene to them.
H. B. 1181 imposes an age-verification requirement for online speech that is obscene to minors. The statute defines covered 鈥 鈥榌s]exual material harmful to minors鈥欌 as material that qualifies as obscene under the Miller test, as adjusted to the perspective of a minor. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 搂129B.001(6); see supra, at 2, 8. And, the statute does not ban adults from accessing this material; it simply requires them to verify their age before accessing it on a covered website. 搂129B.002(a).[7] H. B. 1181 thus falls within Texas鈥檚 traditional power to protect minors from speech that is obscene from their perspective.
2
Because H. B. 1181 simply requires proof of age to access content that is obscene to minors, it does not directly regulate the protected speech of adults. A law can regulate the content of protected speech, and thereby trigger strict scrutiny, either 鈥渙n its face鈥 or in its justification. Reed, 576
U. S., at 163鈥164 (internal quotation marks omitted). H. B. 1181 does not regulate the content of protected speech in either sense. On its face, the statute regulates only speech that is obscene to minors. That speech is unprotected to the extent the State seeks only to verify age. And, the statute can easily 鈥渂e justified without reference to the [protected] content of the regulated speech,鈥 because its apparent purpose is simply to prevent minors, who have no First Amendment right to access speech that is obscene to them, from doing so. Id., at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is not to say, however, that H. B. 1181 escapes all First Amendment scrutiny. Adults have the right to access speech that is obscene only to minors. Butler, 352 U. S., at 383鈥384. And, submitting to age verification is a burden on the exercise of that right. But, adults have no First Amendment right to avoid age verification, and the statute can readily be understood as an effort to restrict minors鈥 access. Any burden experienced by adults is therefore only incidental to the statute鈥檚 regulation of activity that is not protected by the First Amendment. That fact makes intermediate scrutiny the appropriate standard under our precedents. Dale, 530 U. S., at 659.
In this respect, H. B. 1181 is analogous to the prohibition against destroying draft cards that this Court upheld in United States v. 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). The prohibition may have had the effect of making it unlawful to protest the draft by burning one鈥檚 draft card. See id., at 369. But, the 鈥渄estruction鈥 of a draft card is not itself 鈥渃onstitutionally protected activity,鈥 because the card is a Government document that, among other functions, serves as proof of registration. Id., at 376, 378. The prohibition on destroying draft cards thus placed only an incidental burden on First Amendment expression, making it subject to intermediate scrutiny. Id., at 376鈥377. So too here, because accessing material obscene to minors without verifying one鈥檚 age is not constitutionally protected, any burden H. B. 1181 imposes on protected activity is only incidental, and the statute triggers only intermediate scrutiny.
B
Applying the more demanding strict-scrutiny standard would call into question the validity of all age-verification requirements, even longstanding requirements for brick-and-mortar stores. But, as petitioners acknowledge, after Ginsberg, no serious question about the constitutionality of in-person age-verification requirements for obscenity to minors has arisen. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43 (acknowledging that they 鈥渄on鈥檛 know of any . . . challenge being brought鈥 to an age-verification requirement for 鈥渂rick-and-mortar stores鈥). Petitioners insist that their proposed rule would not call into question these 鈥渢raditional鈥 requirements, because such requirements would 鈥渁lmost surely satisfy鈥 strict scrutiny. Id., at 17. They also contend that a sufficiently tailored online age-verification requirement (although not Texas鈥檚) could satisfy strict scrutiny too. Id., at 6鈥8. But, if we are not to compromise 鈥溾榌t]he 鈥渟tarch鈥 in our constitutional standards,鈥欌 we cannot share petitioners鈥 confidence. Ashcroft II, 542 U. S., at 670 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 830 (2000) (THOMAS, J., concurring)).
Strict scrutiny 鈥 which requires a restriction to be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest 鈥 is 鈥渢he most demanding test known to constitutional law.鈥&苍产蝉辫;City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 534 (1997). In the First Amendment context, we have held only once that a law triggered but satisfied strict scrutiny 鈥 to uphold a federal statute that prohibited knowingly providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 27鈥39 (2010). That case involved an unusual application of strict scrutiny, since our analysis relied on the 鈥渄eference鈥 due to the Executive鈥檚 鈥渆valuation of the facts鈥 in the context of 鈥渘ational security and foreign affairs.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 33鈥34.[8] Strict scrutiny is unforgiving because it is the standard for reviewing the direct targeting of fully protected speech. Reed, 576 U. S., at 163. Strict scrutiny is designed to enforce 鈥渢he fundamental principle that governments have no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.鈥&苍产蝉辫;National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U. S. 755, 766 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). It succeeds in that purpose if and only if, as a practical matter, it is fatal in fact absent truly extraordinary circumstances. Strict scrutiny therefore cannot apply to laws, such as in-person age-verification requirements, which are traditional, widespread, and not thought to raise a significant First Amendment issue.
Once again, we need look no further than Ginsberg. There, this Court observed that it 鈥渋s very doubtful鈥 that New York鈥檚 鈥渓egislative finding鈥 about the harmful effects of the speech its statute restricted 鈥渆xpresses an accepted scientific fact.鈥 390 U. S., at 641. Nonetheless, because obscenity to minors is not fully protected speech, this Court readily upheld the statute. Id., at 641鈥643. Had the Court applied strict scrutiny, it could not have so easily cast that doubt aside. Cf. Brown, 564 U. S., at 799鈥800 (declining to defer to a legislature鈥檚 view of 鈥渃ompeting psychological studies鈥 when applying strict scrutiny to a law restricting minors from purchasing violent video games).
Petitioners would like to invalidate H. B. 1181 without upsetting traditional in-person age-verification requirements and perhaps narrower online requirements. But, strict scrutiny is ill suited for such nuanced work. The only principled way to give due consideration to both the First Amendment and States鈥 legitimate interests in protecting minors is to employ a less exacting standard.
C
We also reject petitioners鈥 contention that, regardless of first principles, our precedents require us to apply strict scrutiny to H. B. 1181. Every case that petitioners cite involved a law that banned both adults and minors from accessing speech. But, this Court has never held that every content-based burden on adults鈥 access to speech that is obscene to minors always triggers strict scrutiny.
1
Start with Butler, our earliest relevant precedent. There, this Court implicitly recognized that States may impose some burdens on adults in the course of protecting children from sexual material. The Court held that Michigan鈥檚 legitimate interest in 鈥渟hield[ing] juvenile innocence鈥 could not justify a categorical ban on distributing sexually themed books 鈥 鈥榯ending to the corruption of the morals of youth.鈥欌 352 U. S., at 381, 383. In so holding, the Court admonished the State for overlooking its other statutes 鈥渄esigned to protect its children鈥 that did not impose an outright ban. Id., at 383. One of these laws was a prohibition on exhibiting sexual material 鈥溾榯ending to the corruption of the morals of youth鈥欌 鈥 鈥榠n any . . . place within the view of children passing on any public street or highway.鈥 鈥 Ibid., n. This law imposed a content-based restriction on where adults could view such material. Yet, the Court implicitly suggested that it was a permissible alternative to an outright prohibition.
Similarly, Ginsberg upheld a law that required sellers to verify age if they wished to raise 鈥渉onest mistake鈥 of age as a defense. See 390 U. S., at 644; supra, at 15. In the wake of that decision, the constitutionality of laws like New York鈥檚 that impose in-person age-verification requirements has been taken as a given. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43. And, although Ginsberg did not explicitly address the burden that age verification imposes on adults, in the almost six decades since it was decided, no one has thought to subject such requirements to strict scrutiny.
Petitioners invoke two pre-internet cases in which this Court applied strict scrutiny. In the first, the Court did so to invalidate 鈥渁 blanket prohibition鈥 on 鈥渄ial-a-porn鈥 phone messages that were 鈥渋ndecent but not obscene.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 118, 126 (1989). In the second, we did so to invalidate 鈥渁 blanket ban鈥 on broadcasting 鈥渋ndecent鈥 but 鈥渘ot . . . obscene鈥 cable television channels between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. Playboy, 529 U. S., at 808, 811, 814.[9] In contrast, H. B. 1181 is not a blanket prohibition. Adults remain free to access pornography on covered websites, so long as they verify their ages first. Neither Sable nor Playboy addresses the First Amendment consequences of that more modest burden.
Reno and Ashcroft II 鈥 our two decisions addressing attempts to restrict children鈥檚 access to pornography online 鈥 likewise provide no support for petitioners鈥 position that strict scrutiny applies. Reno applied strict scrutiny to the CDA because it operated as a ban on speech to adults. The CDA made it a crime for any person to post content that is 鈥 鈥榠ndecent鈥 鈥 or 鈥溾榩atently offensive鈥 鈥 anywhere in 鈥渢he entire universe of cyberspace鈥 where the person knew a child would be among the recipients. 521 U. S., at 868, 876. And, although the CDA had an age-verification affirmative defense, that defense was illusory. In many cases, 鈥渆xisting technology did not include any effective method . . . to prevent minors from obtaining access . . . without also denying access to adults.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 876. The CDA thus triggered 鈥 and failed 鈥 strict scrutiny because it 鈥渆ffectively suppresse[d] a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive鈥 and to share. Id., at 874 (emphasis added).[10] This kind of ban is categorically different from H. B. 1181鈥檚 age-verification requirement.
Ashcroft II likewise characterized COPA as a ban. COPA criminally prohibited posting 鈥渃ontent that is 鈥榟armful to minors鈥欌 online for 鈥 鈥榗ommercial purposes,鈥欌 subject to an age-verification affirmative defense. 542 U. S., at 661鈥662. We thus applied strict scrutiny, because, as in Reno, the statute 鈥溾榚ffectively suppresse[d] a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.鈥欌 542 U. S., at 665 (quoting Reno, 521 U. S., at 874). Because the parties agreed that strict scrutiny applied, the Court鈥檚 discussion of the applicable standard was brief. See 542 U. S., at 665. But, its wording was careful. The Government in Ashcroft II conceded that COPA triggered strict scrutiny because it 鈥渞egulates expression . . . that is constitutionally protected for adults . . . on the basis of its content.鈥 Brief for Petitioner in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, O. T. 2003, No. 03鈥218, p. 18. Petitioners make essentially that same argument here. Yet, the Court did not endorse this sweeping proposition; instead, it invoked the narrower ground that COPA outright 鈥 鈥榮uppresse[d]鈥 鈥 speech between adults. Ashcroft II, 542 U. S., at 665.
To be sure, COPA established an age-verification defense. Id., at 662. But, because it did so only as an affirmative defense, COPA still operated as a ban on the public posting of material that is obscene to minors. See id., at 661鈥662 (citing 47 U. S. C. 搂搂231(a)(1), (c)(1)). This was so because an indictment need only 鈥渁lleg[e] the necessary elements of an offense鈥; it need not 鈥渁nticipate affirmative defenses.鈥&苍产蝉辫;United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267, 287鈥288 (1970). Under COPA, the Government thus remained free to bring criminal charges against any covered person who publicly posted speech that was obscene to minors, even if he had fully implemented compliant age-verification procedures.
See Ashcroft II, 542 U. S., at 670鈥671; id., at 674 (Stevens, J., concurring). The same is not true under H. B. 1181, which makes the lack of age verification an element that the State must plead and prove. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 搂129B.002(a).
2
Petitioners read Reno and Ashcroft II to establish a comprehensive framework to govern all future attempts to restrict children鈥檚 access to online pornography. As we have just explained, that view cannot be squared with those cases, which addressed only outright bans on material that was obscene to minors but not to adults. Petitioners also fail to appreciate the context in which those cases were decided. This Court decided both cases when the internet was 鈥渟till more of a prototype than a finished product鈥 鈥 Reno in 1997 and Ashcroft II in 2004, with factual findings made in 1999. A. Kennedy, The Rough Guide to the Internet 493 (8th ed. 2002) (Kennedy). We were mindful that 鈥渏udicial answers鈥 to 鈥渢he totally new problems鈥 presented by new technology are necessarily 鈥渢runcated,鈥 and that in such circumstances 鈥渨e ought not to anticipate鈥 questions beyond those immediately presented. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 300 (1944); accord, TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U. S. , 鈥 (2025) (per curiam) (slip op., at 1鈥2). We did not purport to decide more than the specific circumstances of the cases that were before us.
The Court in Reno was quite concerned about the unique threat that the CDA posed to the development of the thennascent internet. Reno was this Court鈥檚 first decision about the internet. In describing the background of the case, we 鈥渇elt the need to explain . . . that the 鈥業nternet is an international network of interconnected computers,鈥 鈥 NetChoice, 603 U. S., at 713鈥714 (quoting Reno, 521 U. S., at 849), and we marveled that the internet had grown to 40 million users worldwide, id., at 850. In resolving the case, the Court was keenly aware that the 鈥渨holly unprecedented鈥 鈥渂readth of the CDA鈥檚 coverage鈥 鈥渢hreaten[ed] to torch a large segment鈥 of this emerging medium of communication. Id., at 877, 882. In these uncharted waters, the Court was cautious not to definitively establish when regulations on internet pornography triggered strict scrutiny.
Similarly, Ashcroft II was a self-consciously narrow and factbound decision. There, the Court reviewed a preliminary injunction based on a record that was 鈥渙ver five years鈥 old, all while the 鈥渢echnology of the Internet鈥 continued to 鈥渆volv[e] at a rapid pace.鈥 542 U. S., at 671. As a result, we emphasized the abuse-of-discretion standard and made clear that we did not mean to rule definitively on COPA鈥檚 constitutionality. Id., at 673. Moreover, we could not have meant to offer a comprehensive discussion on the appropriate standard of scrutiny for laws protecting children from sexual content online, given that the appropriate standard was not even a contested issue in the case.
In the quarter century since the factual record closed in Ashcroft II, the internet has expanded exponentially. In 1999, only two out of five American households had home internet access. Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, Home Computers and Internet Use in the United States: Aug. 2000, p. 2 (2001). Nearly all those households used a desktop computer or laptop to connect to the internet, and most used a dial-up connection. Dept. of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin., A Nation Online: Entering the Broadband Age 1, 5 (2004).
Connecting through dial-up came with significant limitations: Dial-up is much slower than a modern broadband connection, and because dial-up relied on the home鈥檚 phone line, many households could not use the internet and make or receive phone calls at the same time. See Inline Connection Corp. v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 307, 311 (Del. 2004). And, 鈥渧ideo-on-demand鈥 was largely just a notion that figures like 鈥淏ill Gates and Al Gore rhapsodize[d] about鈥; 鈥渕ost Netizens would [have] be[en] happy with a system fast enough to view static photos without waiting an age.鈥 Kennedy 493鈥494.
In contrast, in 2024, 95 percent of American teens had access to a smartphone, allowing many to access the internet at almost any time and place. M. Faverio & O. Sidoti, Pew Research Center, Teens, Social Media and Technology 2024, p. 19. Ninety-three percent of teens reported using the internet several times per day, and watching videos is among their most common activities online. Id., at 4鈥5, 20. The content easily accessible to adolescents online includes massive libraries of pornographic videos. For instance, in 2019, Pornhub, one of the websites involved in this case, published 1.36 million hours 鈥 or over 150 years 鈥 of new content. App. 177. Many of these readily accessible videos portray men raping and physically assaulting women 鈥 a far cry from the still images that made up the bulk of online pornography in the 1990s. See N. Kristof, The Children of Pornhub, N. Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2020, p. SR4. The Court in Reno and Ashcroft II could not have conceived of these developments, much less conclusively resolve how States could address them.
Of course, Reno and Ashcroft II do not cease to be precedential simply because technology has changed so dramatically. See NetChoice, 603 U. S., at 733鈥734. 鈥淏ut respect for past judgments also means respecting their limits.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. 118, 141 (2022). It is misleading in the extreme to assume that Reno and Ashcroft II spoke to the circumstances of this case simply because they both dealt with 鈥渢he internet鈥 as it existed in the 1990s. The appropriate standard of scrutiny to apply in this case is a difficult question that no prior decision of this Court has squarely addressed. For the reasons we have explained, we hold today that H. B. 1181 triggers only intermediate scrutiny.
D
The dissent鈥檚 arguments for strict scrutiny are no more persuasive than petitioners鈥. The dissent claims that strict scrutiny applies because H. B. 1181 is 鈥渁 quintessential content-based law.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Post, at 6 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). We agree that H. B. 1181 targets speech that is obscene for minors based on its communicative content. But, where the speech in question is unprotected, States may impose 鈥渞estrictions鈥 based on 鈥渃ontent鈥 without triggering strict scrutiny. Stevens, 559 U. S., at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because speech that is obscene to minors is unprotected to the extent that the State imposes only an age-verification requirement, H. B. 1181鈥檚 content-based restriction does not require strict scrutiny. The law is content based in the same way that prohibitions of 鈥渄efamation,鈥 鈥渇raud,鈥 and 鈥渋ncitement鈥 are. Ibid.
The dissent鈥檚 attempt to distinguish 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍&苍产蝉辫;and its progeny fails for the same reason. See post, at 16鈥19. The dissent protests that H. B. 1181 cannot trigger intermediate scrutiny under 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍&苍产蝉辫;because it is 鈥渁 direct regulation of speech,鈥 not 鈥渁 regulation of conduct鈥 that incidentally burdens 鈥渆xpressive activity.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Post, at 17. When speech has both protected and unprotected features, however, 鈥渢he unprotected features of the [speech] are, despite their [communicative] character, essentially a 鈥榥onspeech鈥 element鈥 for purposes of the First Amendment. R. A. v. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 386 (1992). With that principle in hand, H. B. 1181 fits comfortably within the 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍&苍产蝉辫;framework: The law directly regulates unprotected activity (accessing material that is obscene to minors without submitting to age verification) while only incidentally burdening protected activity (ultimately accessing that material).[11]
The dissent鈥檚 real point of disagreement is whether an age-verification requirement regulates the protected speech of adults. On this point, the dissent has nothing to offer aside from the bald assertion that our precedents have held as much. See post, at 5鈥10. But, our precedents have held no such thing. Because our previous decisions concerned only outright bans, see supra, at 22鈥25, this Court has never before considered whether lesser burdens aimed at distinguishing children from adults directly regulate any free speech right of adults.[12]
Instead, as we have explained, the First Amendment leaves undisturbed States鈥 power to impose age limits on speech that is obscene to minors. That power, according to both 鈥渃ommon sense鈥 and centuries of legal tradition, includes the ordinary and appropriate means of exercising it. Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 192. And, an age-verification requirement is an ordinary and appropriate means of enforcing an age limit, as is evident both from all other contexts where the law draws lines based on age and from the long, widespread, and unchallenged practice of requiring age verification for in-person sales of material that is obscene to minors. Supra, at 14鈥17. Beyond misreading precedent, the dissent鈥檚 only other response to our reasoning is to assert that age verification is not necessarily included in the power to draw an age-based line because 鈥渁n age verification mandate burdens an adult鈥檚 First Amendment鈥 rights. Post, at 13. That response simply assumes what the dissent sets out to prove.
The dissent expresses surprise that obscenity for minors is 鈥渙nly partially鈥 protected speech for adults. Post, at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). But, it does not truly deny that this is the case. The defendant in Ginsberg, after all, was an adult vendor of pornography, not an underage purchaser. 390 U. S., at 631. It would be difficult, practically speaking, for States to restrict children鈥檚 access to pornography without regulating adult vendors. And, Ginsberg accordingly held that New York鈥檚 content-based restriction on the rights of adult vendors triggered only rational-basis review. Id., at 641. Thus, so long as the dissent accepts Ginsberg, it cannot deny that the question before us is which content-based regulations States may impose on adults without triggering strict scrutiny, not whether they may do so.
Finally, the dissent claims that we engage in 鈥渂ackwards,鈥 results-oriented reasoning because we are unwilling to adopt a position that would call into question the constitutionality of longstanding in-person age-verification requirements. Post, at 11鈥12. Not so. We appeal to these requirements because they embody a constitutional judgment 鈥 made by generations of legislators and by the American people as a whole 鈥 that commands our respect. A decision 鈥渃ontrary to long and unchallenged practice . . . should be approached with great caution,鈥 鈥渘o less than an explicit overruling鈥 of a precedent. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 835 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). It would be perverse if we showed less regard for in-person age-verification requirements simply because their legitimacy is so uncontroversial that the need for a judicial decision upholding them has never arisen.[13]
E
Texas, like the Fifth Circuit, contends that intermediate scrutiny is too demanding and that only rational-basis review applies. This position fails to account for the incidental burden that age verification necessarily has on an adult鈥檚 First Amendment right to access speech that is obscene only to minors. Rational basis is the appropriate standard for laws that do not implicate 鈥渇undamental constitutional rights鈥 at all. Beach Communications, 508 U. S., at 313. Intermediate scrutiny, which is deferential but not toothless, plays an important role in ensuring that legislatures do not use ostensibly legitimate purposes to disguise efforts to suppress fundamental rights.
Despite advocating for rational-basis review, Texas itself has acknowledged the need for more searching review. The State concedes, for instance, that it could not require as proof of age an 鈥渁ffidavit鈥 from the individual鈥檚 鈥渂iological parent.鈥 Tr. of Oral Arg. 107. That example is precisely the sort of manipulation of a legitimate kind of regulation that intermediate scrutiny can weed out but that rational-basis review cannot.
Texas argues that Ginsberg establishes that age verification requirements receive only rational-basis review. But, although Ginsberg applied that standard to a statute with an age-verification requirement, the Court did not squarely address the incidental effect that the law had on adults鈥 First Amendment rights. See 390 U. S., at 637鈥 643. Moreover, Ginsberg was decided before this Court first articulated the intermediate-scrutiny standard for incidental burdens on free speech. See 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍, 391 U. S., at 376鈥377. In a two-tiered framework, where the only options were strict scrutiny and rational-basis review, the latter was the better standard for an age-verification requirement.
IV
A statute survives intermediate scrutiny if it 鈥渁dvances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Turner II, 520 U. S., at 189. H. B. 1181 readily satisfies these requirements.
A
H. B. 1181 undoubtedly advances an important governmental interest. Texas鈥檚 interest in shielding children from sexual content is important, even 鈥渃ompelling.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Reno, 521 U. S., at 869; Sable, 492 U. S., at 126. H. B. 1181 furthers that interest by preventing minors from easily circumventing a prohibition on their accessing sexual content.
H. B. 1181 is also sufficiently tailored to Texas鈥檚 interest. Under intermediate scrutiny, a regulation is adequately tailored so long as the government鈥檚 interest 鈥渨ould be achieved less effectively absent the regulation鈥 and the regulation 鈥渄oes not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further that interest.鈥&苍产蝉辫;TikTok, 604 U. S., at (slip op., at 16) (internal quotation marks omitted). The regulation 鈥渘eed not be the least restrictive . . . means of 鈥 serving the State鈥檚 interest. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 798 (1989). And, the regulation鈥檚 validity 鈥 鈥榙oes not turn on [our] agreement with the [legislature] concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests鈥 or the degree to which those interests should be promoted.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 800.
Under this standard, requiring age verification online is plainly a legitimate legislative choice. Since at least the days of Ginsberg, States have commonly used age-verification requirements, in the case of in-person access to sexual materials, to reconcile their interest in protecting children with adults鈥 right to avail themselves of such materials. This approach ensures that an age-based ban is not ineffectual, while at the same time allowing adults full access to the content in question after the modest burden of providing proof of age. H. B. 1181 simply adapts this traditional approach to the digital age.
The specific verification methods that H. B. 1181 permits are also plainly legitimate. At present, H. B. 1181 allows for verification using government-issued identification or transactional data. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 搂129B.003(b)(2). Verification can take place on the covered website itself or through a third-party service. 搂129B.003(b). Other age-restricted services, such as online gambling, alcohol and tobacco sales, and car rentals, rely on the same methods. App. 188鈥190, 194, 198. And, much of the online pornography industry has used analogous methods for decades. In Reno, this Court observed that age verification through credit-card transactions 鈥渋s not only technologically available but actually is used by commercial providers of sexually explicit material,鈥 who (unlike many of the noncommercial sites covered by the CDA) 鈥溾榳ould remain relatively unaffected鈥 鈥 were such verification required. 521 U. S., at 856, 863, 881. The District Court in Ashcroft II found that the users of tens of thousands of pornographic websites verified their ages by submitting 鈥渁 copy of a passport or driver鈥檚 license鈥 to a third-party verification service. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 490 (ED Pa. 1999) (findings 51鈥52). H. B. 1181 simply requires established verification methods already in use by pornographic sites and other industries. That choice is well within the State鈥檚 discretion under intermediate scrutiny.
B
Petitioners鈥 counterarguments are unpersuasive. Petitioners contend that Texas could adopt less restrictive means of protecting children, such as encouraging parents to install content-filtering software on their children鈥檚 devices or requiring internet service providers to block adult content unless a household opts in to receiving it. But, even assuming these approaches are equally or more effective, under intermediate scrutiny a 鈥渞egulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government鈥檚 interest could be adequately served by some less-speechrestrictive alternative.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ward, 491 U. S., at 800. Texas鈥檚 interest in shielding children from sexual content 鈥 鈥榳ould be achieved less effectively absent鈥 鈥 H. B. 1181, and it cannot be said that 鈥渁 substantial portion of the burden鈥 that H. B. 1181 imposes fails 鈥渢o advance [Texas鈥檚] goals.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 799. That is enough to show that the Texas Legislature adequately tailored H. B. 1181, regardless of whether some other approach might be superior.[14]
Petitioners further argue that H. B. 1181 is not appropriately tailored, because it does not require age verification on other sites, such as search engines and social-media websites, where children are likely to find sexually explicit content. But, under intermediate scrutiny, 鈥溾榯he First Amendment imposes no freestanding underinclusiveness limitation,鈥 鈥 and Texas 鈥 鈥榥eed not address all aspects of a problem in one fell swoop.鈥欌 TikTok, 604 U. S., at (slip op., at 15). Further, Texas has a reasonable basis for excluding these sites from H. B. 1181鈥檚 coverage. The statute does not contain any special exception for social-media sites. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 搂129B.002(a). Rather, such sites fall outside the statute to the extent that less than a third of their content is obscene to minors. And, it is reasonable for Texas to conclude that websites with a higher proportion of sexual content are more inappropriate for children to visit than those with a lower proportion. The statute, on the other hand, does explicitly exempt search engines. 搂129B.005(b). But, search engines do not exercise the same degree of control over the websites to which they link, so the State could reasonably conclude that it makes less sense to regulate them.
Petitioners next assert that privacy concerns and the unique stigma surrounding pornography will make age verification too chilling for adults. But, users only have to submit verification to the covered website itself or the third-party service with which the website contracts. See 搂129B.003(b). Both those entities have every incentive to assure users of their privacy. In any event, the use of pornography has always been the subject of social stigma. This social reality has never been a reason to exempt the pornography industry from otherwise valid regulation. Cf. United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U. S. 194, 209 (2003) (plurality opinion) (holding that the 鈥渞isk of embarrassment鈥 involved in asking a librarian to unblock a website wrongly blocked as obscene did not impose a cognizable burden on a library patron鈥檚 access to speech). And, the decades-long history of some pornographic websites requiring age verification refutes any argument that the chill of verification is an insurmountable obstacle for users.
* * *
H. B. 1181 simply requires adults to verify their age before they can access speech that is obscene to children. It is therefore subject only to intermediate scrutiny, which it readily survives. The statute advances the State鈥檚 important interest in shielding children from sexually explicit content. And, it is appropriately tailored because it permits users to verify their ages through the established methods of providing government-issued identification and sharing transactional data. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Notes
[1] An entity may also verify age by requiring users to 鈥減rovide digital identification,鈥 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 搂129B.003(b)(1), which is defined as 鈥渋nformation stored on a digital network that may be accessed by a commercial entity and that serves as proof of the identity of an individual,鈥 搂129B.003(a). The State concedes that 鈥淭exas does not yet have a state issued digital identification card or app.鈥 App. 189. Petitioners maintain that no other identification could qualify as 鈥渄igital ID鈥 under this definition. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36鈥37. We assume without deciding that petitioners are correct.
[2] See Ala. Code 搂8鈥19G鈥3(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024); 2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 193 (to be codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 搂18鈥701(A)); Ark. Code Ann. 搂4鈥88鈥1304(a) (2023); 2024 Fla. Laws ch. 42, 搂2 (to be codified at Fla. Stat. 搂501.1737(2)); 2024 Ga. Laws p. 316 (to be codified at Ga. Code Ann. 搂39鈥5鈥5(b)); Idaho Code Ann. 搂6鈥3803(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024); Ind. Code 搂24鈥4鈥23鈥10 (Cum. Supp. 2024); 2024 Kan. Sess. Laws p. 451 (to be codified at Kan. Stat. Ann. 搂50鈥6146(a)); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 搂436.002(1) (West Cum. Supp. 2024); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 搂51:2121(A)(1) (West 2025); Miss. Code Ann. 搂11鈥77鈥5(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024); Mont. Code Ann. 搂30鈥14鈥159(1) (2023); Neb. Rev. Stat. 搂87鈥1003(1) (2024); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 搂66鈥501(a) (Supp. 2024); H. B. 1561, 69th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess., 搂1 (N. D. 2025) (to be codified at N. D. Cent. Code Ann. 搂51鈥07(2)); S. C. Code Ann. 搂37鈥1鈥310(C)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024); H. B. 1053, 100th Leg. Sess., 搂4 (S. D. 2025) (to be codified in S. D. Codified Laws ch. 22鈥24); Tenn. Code Ann. 搂39鈥17鈥912(c) (Supp. 2024); Utah Code 搂78B鈥3鈥1002(1) (Supp. 2024); Va. Code Ann. 搂8.01鈥40.5(B) (2024); 2025 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 139, 搂1 (to be codified at Wyo. Stat. Ann. 搂14鈥3鈥502(a)).
[3] H. B. 1181 covers only depictions of activity that would qualify as 鈥渟exual conduct鈥 in an adult obscenity statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 搂129B.001(6)(B). We therefore need not decide whether a statute addressing obscenity to minors can define a broader range of activity as 鈥渟exual conduct鈥 than an adult obscenity statute.
[4] Elsewhere in the CDA, Congress recognized that content filtering was still an emerging technology and that companies attempting to use it faced serious risks. A year before the CDA鈥檚 enactment, a New York court had held that an online service provider could be held liable as a publisher for defamatory posts by third-party users because the provider had 鈥渉eld itself out as鈥 鈥渁 family oriented computer network鈥 that screened out inappropriate content. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, *2 (Sup. Ct. N. Y., May 24, 1995). In response, the CDA added a new 搂230 to the Communications Act of 1934. 搂509, 110 Stat. 137鈥139 (codified as amended at 47 U. S. C. 搂230). Section 230 provides that computer service providers (1) shall not 鈥渂e treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by鈥 a third party, and (2) shall not 鈥渂e held liable鈥 for good-faith actions to restrict access to material that they consider to be 鈥渙bscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,鈥 or to enable others (such as users) to restrict access to such material. 搂230(c). Congress thereby aimed to spur the development and use of filtering technology so that parents could prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit content online. See 搂509, 110 Stat. 137 (title) (鈥淥nline Family Empowerment鈥); 47 U. S. C. 搂230 (title) (鈥淧rotection for private blocking and screening of offensive material鈥); 搂230(c) (title) (鈥淧rotection for 鈥楪ood Samaritan鈥 blocking and screening of offensive material鈥); 141 Cong. Rec. 22045 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Cox) (鈥淲e want to encourage鈥 computer service providers 鈥渢o help us control . . . what our children see鈥 using filtering 鈥渢echnology鈥 that 鈥渋s very quickly becoming available鈥).
5 See Tex. Lottery Comm鈥檔, News Release, Texas Lottery Adds Age Verification to Self-Service Vending Machines (Jan. 7, 2025).
[6] See, e.g., Ala. Code 搂搂13A鈥12鈥200.5(1), 13A鈥12鈥200.5(3)(a) (2015); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 搂搂13鈥3501(3)(b), 13鈥3506(A) (2018); Ark. Code Ann. 搂搂5鈥68鈥501(3)(B), 5鈥68鈥502(a)(2) (2024); Cal. Penal Code Ann. 搂313.1(a) (West 2024); Colo. Rev. Stat. 搂搂18鈥7鈥501(3)(b), 18鈥7鈥502(1) (2024); Conn. Gen. Stat. 搂 53a鈥196 (2025); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, 搂搂1365(a)(2), (i)(1) (2015); D. C. Code 搂搂22鈥2201(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(F)(ii) (2001鈥2024); Fla. Stat. 搂搂847.012(1)(b), (3) (2023); Ga. Code Ann. 搂搂16鈥12鈥102(2)(B), 16鈥12鈥103(a) (2024); Idaho Code Ann. 搂搂18鈥1514(10), 18鈥1515(1) (2016); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, 搂搂5/11鈥21(b), (c)(1) (West 2023); Ind. Code 搂搂35鈥 49鈥3鈥3(a)(1), 35鈥49鈥3鈥4(a)(3) (2024); Iowa Code 搂搂728.2, 728.10 (2023); Kan. Stat. Ann. 搂搂21鈥6401(b), (h)(1) (2023); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 搂搂14:91.11(A)(1), (D) (West 2018); Minn. Stat. Ann. 搂搂617.292, subd. 8(2), 617.293, subd. 1 (West 2018); Mont. Code Ann. 搂搂45鈥8鈥206(1), (2)(a) (2023); Neb. Rev. Stat. 搂搂28鈥808(1), 28鈥810(1) (2016); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 搂搂571鈥揃:1(II)(b), 571鈥揃:2(I) (2021); N. M. Stat. Ann. 搂搂30鈥37鈥 1(G)(2), 30鈥37鈥2 (Lexis Nexis 2014); N. Y. Penal Law Ann. 搂搂235.21(1), 235.23(2) (West 2024); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 搂搂14鈥190.15(a), 14鈥19.15(c)(3) (2023); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 搂搂2907.31(A)(1), (B)(3) (West 2020); Okla. Stat., tit. 21, 搂搂1040.75(13)(b), 1040.76(2) (2011); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 搂搂5903(c), (e)(7)(ii) (Cum Supp. 2022); S. C. Code Ann. 搂搂16鈥15鈥385(A), (C)(3) (2023); S. D. Codified Laws 搂搂22鈥24鈥28, 22鈥24鈥31(1) (2017); Utah Code Ann. 搂76鈥10鈥1206(1)(a) (Lexis Nexis 2017); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, 搂搂2802a(a), 2805(b)(1) (2018); Va. Code Ann. 搂搂18.2鈥390(7)(b), 18.2鈥391(A), (E) (2021); Wis. Stat. Ann. 搂948.11(2) (West 2023).
[7] The parties dispute whether H. B. 1181鈥檚 definition of 鈥 鈥榌s]exual material harmful to minors鈥 鈥 requires covered speech to be obscene to all minors (including 17-year-olds) or only to a minor (including a toddler). We need not resolve that question here. Whatever obscenity to minors can mean, the Texas Legislature plainly meant to tie H. B. 1181鈥檚 definition to that category of speech. We also doubt that this dispute is as significant as it first may seem. Because the statute only covers explicit portrayals of nudity or sex acts that predominantly appeal to the prurient interest, it cannot conceivably be read to cover, say, a PG鈥13or R-rated movie. We further question whether it is coherent to speak of the 鈥 鈥榩rurient interest鈥 鈥 of a very young child with no concept of sexuality, so any reading of the statute may well call for assessing obscenity from the perspective of an adolescent. See Ashcroft II, 542 U. S. 656, 679 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The parties also dispute whether H. B. 1181 permits a covered website to require age verification for its sexual material harmful to minors but not for its other content. We need not resolve this disagreement either. Even if the statute requires covered websites to demand age verification for all their content, and even if such a requirement would be unconstitutional, petitioners still have not shown that H. B. 1181 is facially invalid. Under our precedents, a statute is facially invalid under the First Amendment only if its 鈥渦nconstitutional applications鈥 are 鈥渟ubstantially disproportionate to the statute鈥檚 lawful sweep.鈥&苍产蝉辫;United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 770 (2023). Here, petitioners have not even attempted to show that the covered websites that would segregate their content if given the choice substantially outnumber those that would not.
[8] In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U. S. 433 (2015), a bare majority held that a ban on the personal solicitation of campaign donations by candidates for judicial office survived strict scrutiny. Id., at 444鈥456. But, only four Members of the majority thought that the statute triggered strict scrutiny to begin with. Id., at 442鈥444 (plurality opinion). The fifth Member, Justice Ginsburg, concluded that strict scrutiny did not apply and that States enjoy 鈥渟ubstantial latitude . . . to enact campaign-finance rules geared to judicial elections.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 457鈥458 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
[9] Playboy held that the statute at issue triggered strict scrutiny because it banned 鈥 鈥30 to 50% of all adult programming.鈥 鈥 529 U. S., at 812; see ibid. (鈥淭o prohibit this much speech is a significant restriction. . . 鈥 (emphasis added)). Any discussion in that opinion of whether lesser burdens would also trigger strict scrutiny, see post, at 19鈥20 (KAGAN, J., dissenting), was dicta. In any event, Playboy at a minimum cannot speak to when burdens on obscenity to minors trigger strict scrutiny. Playboy addressed a statute restricting 鈥 鈥榠ndecent鈥 鈥 speech, 529 U. S., at 811, which is a broader category than obscenity to minors and so is entitled to greater First Amendment protection, see Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 877 (1997) (holding that indecent speech encompasses 鈥渓arge amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or other value鈥). Thus, a burden on obscenity to minors may not trigger strict scrutiny even if a comparable burden on indecent speech would.
[10] The dissent contends that Reno imposed a regulation 鈥渟imilar to Texas鈥檚 law,鈥 not a ban. Post, at 19. But, at the same time, the dissent acknowledges that the statute at issue in Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115 (1989), was a ban. See ibid. And, Reno held that 鈥渢he CDA effectively resembles the ban on 鈥榙ial-a-porn鈥 invalidated in Sable.鈥 521 U. S., at 875. The dissent鈥檚 characterization of Reno is at war with Reno鈥檚 description of itself.
[11] The dissent complains that Sable, Playboy, Reno, and Ashcroft II never 鈥減roposed an analogy to 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Post, at 18; United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803 (2000). That fact is unsurprising. Because all four cases involved outright bans on speech that is at most obscene only to minors, see supra, at 22鈥25, the statutes at issue directly (and not merely incidentally) regulated adults鈥 protected speech.
[12] The dissent is correct that, for fully protected speech, 鈥渢he distinction between bans and burdens makes no difference to the level of scrutiny.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Post, at 20. But, when the First Amendment partially protects speech, such that the government may impose certain content-based restrictions on it but may not proscribe it outright, the distinction between a ban and lesser burdens is meaningful.
[13] Even the dissent recognizes the force of this point to some extent, which is why it insists that in-person age-verification requirements would have 鈥渁 real chance of surviving鈥 under its approach. Post, at 12. But, the dissent has no way to make good on this assurance other than to say that strict scrutiny need not be a 鈥渉orror show鈥 for States 鈥 or, in other words, that the First Amendment is not really as great an obstacle to suppressing fully protected speech as it might seem. Post, at 11.
[14] Petitioners contend that H. B. 1181 does not allow covered websites to use newer biometric methods of age verification, like face scans, that they claim are less likely to give rise to privacy concerns. Texas disagrees, maintaining that H. B. 1181 does allow such methods. We need not resolve this disagreement because Texas is not required to adopt the least restrictive means of advancing its interests to pass intermediate scrutiny. Ward, 491 U. S., at 800. It is sufficient that verifying age by government identification and transactional data is a legitimate legislative choice that does not impose excessive burdens on users.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 23鈥1122
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FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
[June 27, 2025]
JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
No one doubts that the distribution of sexually explicit speech to children, of the sort involved here, can cause great harm. Or to say the same thing in legal terms, no one doubts that States have a compelling interest in shielding children from speech of that kind. What is more, children have no constitutional right to view it. The Texas statute before us (H. B. 1181) addresses speech understood in First Amendment law as 鈥渙bscene for minors.鈥 That label means the First Amendment does not protect the speech for minors. The State can restrict their access without fear of colliding with the Constitution.
The trouble comes in the last two sentences鈥 italics. Speech that is obscene for minors is often not so for adults. For them, the category of obscene 鈥 and therefore unprotected speech 鈥 is narrower. See ante, at 8鈥10. So adults have a constitutional right to view the very same speech that a State may prohibit for children. And it is a fact of life 鈥 and also of law 鈥 that adults and children do not live in hermetically sealed boxes. In preventing children from gaining access to 鈥渙bscene for children鈥 speech, States sometimes take measures impeding adults from viewing it too 鈥 even though, for adults, it is constitutionally protected expression. What, then, to do?
Cases raising that question have reached this Court on no fewer than four prior occasions 鈥 and we have given the same answer, consistent with general free speech principles, each and every time. Under those principles, we apply strict scrutiny, a highly rigorous but not fatal form of constitutional review, to laws regulating protected speech based on its content. See ante, at 6. And laws like H. B. 1181 fit that description: They impede adults from viewing a class of speech protected for them (even though not for children) and defined by its content. So when we have confronted those laws before, we have always asked the strictscrutiny question: Is the law the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest? See ibid. There is no reason to change course.
A law like H. B. 1181 might well pass the strict-scrutiny test, hard as it usually is to do so. As just noted, everyone agrees that shielding children from exposure to the sexually explicit speech H. B. 1181 targets is a compelling state interest. And Texas might be right in arguing that it has no less restrictive way to achieve that goal: It is difficult, as everyone also agrees, to limit minors鈥 access to things appearing on the internet. If H. B. 1181 is the best Texas can do 鈥 meaning, the means of achieving the State鈥檚 objective while restricting adults鈥 speech rights the least 鈥 then the statute should pass First Amendment review.
But what if Texas could do better 鈥 what if Texas could achieve its interest without so interfering with adults鈥 constitutionally protected rights in viewing the speech H. B. 1181 covers? That is the ultimate question on which the Court and I disagree. The majority says that Texas may enforce its statute regardless, because only intermediate scrutiny applies and that test does not ask whether a State has adopted the least speech-restrictive means available. I disagree, based on conventional First Amendment rules and the way we have consistently applied them in this very context. The State should be foreclosed from restricting adults鈥 access to protected speech if that is not in fact necessary.
The majority鈥檚 opinion concluding to the contrary is, to be frank, confused. The opinion, to start with, is at war with itself. Parts suggest that the First Amendment plays no role here 鈥 that because Texas鈥檚 law works through age verification mandates, the First Amendment is beside the point. See ante, at 13鈥18. But even the majority eventually gives up that ghost. As, really, it must. H. B. 1181鈥檚 requirements interfere with 鈥 or, in First Amendment jargon, burden 鈥 the access adults have to protected speech: Some individuals will forgo that speech because of the need to identify themselves to a website (and maybe, from there, to the world) as a consumer of sexually explicit expression. But still, the majority proposes, that burden demands only intermediate scrutiny because it arises from an 鈥渋ncidental鈥 restriction, given that Texas鈥檚 statute uses age verification to prevent minors from viewing the speech. See ante, at 13, 18鈥19. Except that is wrong 鈥 nothing like what we have ever understood as an incidental restraint for First Amendment purposes. Texas鈥檚 law defines speech by content and tells people entitled to view that speech that they must incur a cost to do so. That is, under our First Amendment law, a direct (not incidental) regulation of speech based on its content 鈥 which demands strict scrutiny.
The majority鈥檚 attempt to distinguish our four precedents saying just that rounds out the list of its errors. According to the majority, all of those decisions involved prohibiting rather than merely burdening adults鈥 access to obscene-forchildren speech. See ante, at 21. But that is not true. And in any event it would not matter: The First Amendment prevents making speech hard, as well as banning it outright. So on all accounts the majority鈥檚 rationale craters.
The majority is not shy about why it has adopted these special-for-the-occasion, difficult-to-decipher rules. It thinks they are needed to get to what it considers the right result: giving Texas permission to enforce its statute. See ante, at 19鈥21. But Texas should not receive that permission if it can achieve its goal as to minors while interfering less with the speech choices of adults. And if it cannot, then Texas鈥檚 statute would survive strict scrutiny, given the obvious importance of its goal. For that reason, the majority鈥檚 analysis is as unnecessary as it is unfaithful to the law.
I
Under ordinary First Amendment doctrine, this Court should subject H. B. 1181 to strict scrutiny. That is because H. B. 1181 covers speech constitutionally protected for adults; impedes adults鈥 ability to view that speech; and imposes that burden based on the speech鈥檚 content. Case closed. And making the right answer yet more obvious, we have said as much four times before, when reviewing statutes imposing similar content-based burdens on protected sexually explicit speech. So the case is closed even tighter: The standard should be strict scrutiny. The only open question here should be whether H. B. 1181 can satisfy that test.
A
No one (not even Texas, not even the majority) disputes that H. B. 1181 covers a substantial amount of speech protected by the First Amendment. We have, of course, often held that obscene speech, as defined in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), is not so protected. But H. B. 1181 does not use the ordinary Miller test (relating to prurience, offensiveness, and value) as the trigger for regulation. Instead, it adapts each part of that test 鈥渇or minors,鈥 thus covering speech that is 鈥渙bscene from a child鈥檚 perspective.鈥 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 搂129B.002(a) (West Cum. Supp. 2024); ante, at 9 (emphasis deleted). And that childcentric category of speech extends wider than the traditional obscenity category. See ante, at 9鈥10. In the gap between the two is much sexually explicit speech that adults have every right to view. For adults cannot be limited to 鈥渙nly what is fit for children.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957). Their right to view 鈥淸s]exual expression,鈥 outside the traditional obscenity category, is 鈥減rotected by the First Amendment.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989).
And H. B. 1181 impedes the exercise of that right. Recall how the statute works. To enter a covered website 鈥 with all the protected speech just described 鈥 an individual must verify his age by using either a 鈥済overnment-issued identification鈥 like a driver鈥檚 license or 鈥渢ransactional data鈥 associated with things like a job or mortgage. 搂搂129B.001(7), 129B.003(b)(2); see ante, at 2鈥3. For the would-be consumer of sexually explicit materials, that requirement is a deterrent: It imposes what our First Amendment decisions often call a 鈥渃hilling effect.鈥&苍产蝉辫;E.g., Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U. S. 595, 606 (2021). It is not, contra the majority, like having to flash ID to enter a club. See ante, at 14鈥15. It is turning over information about yourself and your viewing habits 鈥 respecting speech many find repulsive 鈥 to a website operator, and then to . . . who knows? The operator might sell the information; the operator might be hacked or subpoenaed. We recognized the problem in a case involving sexual material on cable TV: Similar demands, we decided, would 鈥渞estrict viewing by subscribers who fear for their reputations should the operator, advertently or inadvertently, disclose the list of those who wish to watch the 鈥榩atently offensive鈥 channel.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U. S. 727, 754 (1996). The internet context can only increase the fear. And the Texas law imposes costs not just on potential users, but on website operators too. They must either implement a system costing (the District Court found) at least $40,000 for every 100,000 verifications, or else pay penalties of $10,000 per day. See 搂129B.006(b); Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Colmenero, 689 F. Supp. 3d 373, 385鈥386 (WD Tex. 2023). Those expenses, Texas boasts, have already caused one major operator to exit the State鈥檚 market. See Brief for Respondent 21. So in multiple ways, H. B. 1181 burdens expression.
Finally, H. B. 1181 imposes those burdens on protected speech based on the speech鈥檚 鈥渃ommunicative content,鈥 making it a quintessential content-based law. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 163 (2015). A statute, we have often said, is content-based on its face when it 鈥渄raws distinctions鈥 based on the 鈥渢opic,鈥 鈥渟ubject matter,鈥 鈥渋dea,鈥 or 鈥渕essage expressed.鈥&苍产蝉辫;E.g., ibid. H. B. 1181 does just that. It applies when more than a third of the expression on a website is 鈥渟exual material鈥 of a certain kind (prurient, offensive, and valueless for minors). 搂搂129B.001(6), 129B.002(a). And whether expression qualifies as such material depends entirely on what it depicts. If the website has the requisite sexually explicit content, the regulation kicks in. Alternatively, if that content is absent (if, say, the website focuses on politics or sports), the regulation does not. 鈥淭hat is about as content-based as it gets.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Barr v. American Assn. of Political Consultants, Inc., 591 U. S. 610, 619 (2020) (plurality opinion). Not even the majority disputes the point. See ante, at 28.
All of that leads, under well-settled law, to just one conclusion: H. B. 1181 is subject to strict scrutiny. Take a law burdening protected speech based on its content 鈥 as H. B. 1181 does for every adult 鈥 and the standard of review follows in its wake. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642 (1994) (We 鈥渁pply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content鈥). It does not matter whether we are persuaded in a given case that the State, in passing the regulation, had laudable, even compelling aims. See Reed, 576 U. S., at 166 (A good 鈥渏ustification cannot transform a facially content-based law into鈥 the opposite). Those interests are considered only in applying strict scrutiny, not in deciding whether that is the right standard to be applied. Over the years, we have recited the governing rule almost like a mantra: If a law burdens protected speech based on what that speech says or depicts 鈥 as H. B. 1181 does 鈥 the law has to clear the strict-scrutiny bar.
B
What is more, our precedents have applied that rule in four cases similar to this one 鈥 when a statute has limited adults鈥 access to sexually explicit materials in order to prevent those materials from getting to minors. The laws at issue pertained to diverse media 鈥 the telephone, cable, and (twice, as here) the internet. But the analysis about the level of scrutiny was in each case the same. To show the Court鈥檚 (previous) consistency 鈥 and its relevance today 鈥 it is worth reviewing them one by one by one by one.
In Sable Communications v. FCC, the Court considered a statute directed at dial-a-porn services that prohibited sexually 鈥渋ndecent鈥 telephone messages, extending beyond those obscene for adults under Miller. 492 U. S., at 122鈥123. The Government defended the law as an effort to protect children from exposure to the speech. See id., at 128. We recognized that interest as compelling. See id., at 126. But we also understood that adults had a 鈥減rotected鈥 First Amendment right to listen to the non-obscene indecent speech that the law covered. Ibid. And so the Court applied strict scrutiny 鈥 thus requiring the Government to show that the statute did not 鈥渦nnecessarily interfer[e] with [adults鈥橾 First Amendment freedoms.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ibid.
Then, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 859鈥861 (1997), the Court addressed a statute barring internet transmissions of obscene, indecent, or 鈥減atently offensive鈥 messages to those under 18, with an affirmative defense available to anyone making use of age verification measures. Although the statute encompassed only communications to minors and excused from penalties those using a 鈥渞easonable鈥 method to verify age, the Court recognized the 鈥渂urden鈥 that the statute would impose 鈥渙n adult speech.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 860, 874. Because of that 鈥渋nterfere[nce] with adult-to-adult communication鈥 鈥 and despite the significance of the Government interest 鈥渋n protecting children鈥 鈥 the Court again insisted on applying strict scrutiny. Id., at 875鈥876. So once more the key issue was whether 鈥渓ess restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving鈥 the Government鈥檚 goals. Id., at 874. Next, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 806 (2000), the Court evaluated a law requiring that 鈥渟exually-oriented鈥 cable channels 鈥渓imit their transmission to hours when children are unlikely to be viewing.鈥 鈥淸W]hat standard [must] the Government鈥 meet, the Court asked, for the law to survive? Id., at 814. We did not think the question close. 鈥淎s we consider a content-based regulation鈥 of 鈥減rotected speech,鈥 we said, 鈥渢he answer should be clear: The standard is strict scrutiny.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ibid.; see id., at 812鈥813. So 鈥渋f a less restrictive means鈥 would serve the Government鈥檚 goals, 鈥渢he Government must use it.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 815. Otherwise, the Court explained, the Government could, contrary to the First Amendment, 鈥渞estrict speech without an adequate justification.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 813.
And the denouement: The statute the Court addressed in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656 (2004), was a near-twin of Texas鈥檚. The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) prohibited commercial entities from posting on the internet content 鈥渉armful to minors.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 661 (quoting 47 U. S. C. 搂231(a)(1)). And just like H. B. 1181, that statute defined the covered material by adapting the Miller obscenity test for children 鈥 thus creating a category of obscene-for-children speech. See 542 U. S., at 661鈥 662; supra, at 4. So too, COPA made the adoption of an age verification system crucial. It did so by providing an affirmative defense to any entity that verified age through an 鈥渁dult personal identification number鈥 or similar mechanism before granting access to the posted materials. Ashcroft, 542 U. S., at 662. So, as in H. B. 1181, if the poster verified age, no liability could attach. How, then, to analyze such a statute? The Court viewed the problem as it had in prior cases: COPA, though directed at keeping sexually explicit materials from children, 鈥渨as likely to burden some speech that is protected for adults.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 665. And because of that 鈥渃ontent-based restriction[],鈥 the Court needed to apply strict scrutiny. Id., at 660, 665, 670. The Government thus had to show that 鈥渢he proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the challenged statute.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 665. In short, Ashcroft adhered to the view that 鈥溾榯he governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials鈥 does not 鈥榡ustify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.鈥欌 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525, 581 (2001) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Reno, 521 U. S., at 875).[1]
Four times, one result. Which is not surprising, because it is the result that basic First Amendment principles command. A statute tries to cut off children鈥檚 access to sexually explicit speech, in line with the most worthy objectives. But the statute as well impedes adults鈥 access to that speech, which the First Amendment protects. And the statute does so by drawing content-based lines: Sexually explicit speech is burdened, other speech is not. It follows, as the night the day, that strict scrutiny applies 鈥 that the statute, in addition to serving a compelling purpose, can restrict only as much adult speech as is needed to achieve the State鈥檚 goal. That is true in the four cases above, and it is true in this case too.
C
Applying strict scrutiny in this context, however, need not be a death sentence. To the contrary, a State exercising care should be able to devise a regulatory means of achieving its objective consistent with the First Amendment.
The first part of the strict-scrutiny test is here easy to meet. The majority is right that a State has a compelling interest in shielding children from the obscene-for-children materials that H. B. 1181 covers. See ante, at 32. This Court has said as much before. See Sable, 492 U. S., at 126 (recognizing a 鈥渃ompelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors,鈥 which 鈥渆xtends to shielding鈥 them from materials 鈥渘ot obscene by adult standards鈥); Denver Area, 518 U. S., at 743 (plurality opinion) (noting that the interest in 鈥減rotect[ing] children from exposure to patently offensive sex-related material鈥 is 鈥渙ne that this Court has often found compelling鈥). And a State is entitled to think that the need has become only more urgent over the years, given the time children now spend online and the materials they can find there. See ante, at 27.
The critical question, then, is whether the State can show that it has limited no more adult speech than is necessary to achieve its goal. Or said another way (in fact, Ashcroft鈥檚 way), whether the State can show that 鈥渢he proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the challenged statute.鈥 542 U. S., at 665. If the State cannot, the statute should not take effect, because it would limit protected speech unnecessarily. There would be every reason to make the State switch to a less-speech-restrictive, equally-or-more-effective regulatory mechanism. But a State that has closely attended to the speech consequences of its regulation might well make the required showing in this sphere. Given how the internet works, no court should expect that a law effectively shielding children from sexually explicit expression could leave adults wholly unaffected. To the contrary, such a law will almost necessarily impose corollary burdens. And Texas may be right that the commonly proposed alternatives to laws like H. B. 1181 鈥 such as content filtering technology 鈥 cannot equal, or even approach, age verification systems in effectiveness. See Brief for Respondent 37鈥38. In that event, those alternatives will be irrelevant to the inquiry, and a court will explore only whether another, equally effective age verification mechanism will place a lesser burden on protected speech. Review of that kind should not be the horror show for Texas and other States that the majority maintains. See ante, at 19鈥21. It is just what they should have to pass before implementing a content-based burden on protected expression.
II
How does the majority reach a different result?
The analytic path of today鈥檚 opinion is winding, but I take the majority to begin with a conviction about where it must not end 鈥 with strict scrutiny. The majority is not so coy about this backwards reasoning. To the contrary, it defends it. See ante, at 30. The 鈥渓egitimacy鈥 of age verification schemes for sexually explicit speech, the majority tells us, is 鈥渦ncontroversial鈥 (despite Reno and Ashcroft). Ante, at 30. And 鈥淸a]pplying the more demanding strict-scrutiny standard would call鈥 those schemes 鈥渋nto question.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 19. Ergo, its conclusion. I have just explained why the majority鈥檚 fear is overblown 鈥 why in fact carefully drawn age verification laws stand a real chance of surviving strict scrutiny. But suppose I am wrong. Suppose there are both less speech-restrictive and equally effective ways to accomplish the State鈥檚 goal of protecting children from sexually explicit materials. In that event, strict scrutiny tells us, the State should use those constitutionally superior alternatives. And why argue with that? The usual way constitutional review works is to figure out the right standard (here, strict scrutiny because H. B. 1181 is content-based), and let that standard work to a conclusion. It is not to assume the conclusion (approve H. B. 1181 and similar age verification laws) and pick the standard sure to arrive there. But that is what the majority does. To answer what standard of scrutiny applies, the majority first spends four pages lauding age verification schemes as 鈥渃ommon,鈥 鈥渢raditional,鈥 鈥渁ppropriate,鈥 and 鈥渘ecessary.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 13鈥18. In other words, all over the place, and a good thing too. No wonder the majority doesn鈥檛 land on strict scrutiny.
The more puzzling question is how the majority鈥檚 reasoning fits with the idea that the First Amendment plays any role at all. For quite some time in today鈥檚 opinion, speech rights are pushed to the sidelines, or entirely off the field. Age verification schemes are just age verification schemes 鈥 again, 鈥渃ommon,鈥 鈥渢raditional,鈥 鈥渁ppropriate,鈥 and 鈥渘ecessary.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ibid. States use them to regulate purchases of liquor and lottery tickets and fireworks. And so, the majority says, States can also use them to regulate access to speech that is obscene for children. The power to prevent minors from gaining access to that speech 鈥渘ecessarily includes鈥 the power to require proof of age. Ante, at 13. And that means, the majority concludes, that 鈥渁ccessing material obscene to minors without verifying one鈥檚 age is not constitutionally protected,鈥 even for adults. Ante, at 19 (emphasis deleted). It would seem the analysis is complete. If the First Amendment does not protect adults in viewing obscene-for-children materials unimpeded by age verification, as the majority argues, then how could there be any constitutional objection to age verification laws like H. B. 1181? Or said otherwise, why would those laws have to satisfy any heightened constitutional standard, whether strict or intermediate? We have apparently arrived at a place where States can act free of all constitutional scrutiny.
But that cannot be, for reasons that by now should sound familiar. As discussed earlier, speech that is obscene for children is often not obscene for adults. See supra, at 4鈥5. When that is so, the First Amendment protects adults鈥 access to obscene-for-children speech (unlike to liquor, lottery tickets, or fireworks). Or otherwise said, the First Amendment gives them a right in that expression. And because of that protected right, different rules apply. Without a special justification, a State cannot prohibit, tax, impede, or otherwise burden an adult鈥檚 access to obscene-for-children speech. And an age verification requirement is a kind of burden. It may be smaller or larger 鈥 compare flashing ID in a store with (in the majority鈥檚 own example) having to produce 鈥渁n affidavit from [a] biological parent.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 30. It may be a simple inconvenience or it may, as suggested earlier, prevent individuals from exercising the right. See supra, at 5鈥6. And those differences may well matter to the conclusion when a court gets around to applying the appropriate constitutional standard. But regardless, an age verification mandate burdens an adult鈥檚 First Amendment protected right in viewing obscene-for-children expression. So a State鈥檚 power to prohibit that speech for minors does not 鈥渘ecessarily include[],鈥 as the majority contends, the power to mandate age verification. Ante, at 13. It might or might not, depending on whether the mandate satisfies the constitutional scrutiny that its burden on protected speech requires.
And in the end, the majority has to accept some version of that argument. For page upon page, the majority explains that the First Amendment has nothing to say about age verification schemes attached to obscene-for-children speech. See ante, at 13鈥18. Again, that speech may as well be liquor, lottery tickets, or fireworks, for all it matters to the 鈥淪tates鈥 authority.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 13. And then, in the space of one brief paragraph, the idea falls apart. Yes, the majority at last concedes, 鈥淸a]dults have the right to access speech that is obscene only to minors.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 18. And yes, the majority admits, 鈥渟ubmitting to age verification is a burden on the exercise of that right.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ibid. So sure, the majority acknowledges, a really onerous age verification scheme 鈥 like its parental affidavit requirement 鈥 would flunk constitutional review. See ante, at 31. And so too, the majority says, even the least onerous mandate, like the one in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 633, 643鈥644 (1968), to show ID in a store, has to satisfy some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny. See ante, at 22, 31鈥32.[2] There is no getting around the fact: Obscene-for-children speech is constitutionally protected speech for adults. See ante, at 18. And age verification schemes 鈥渂urden[ing]鈥 adults鈥 鈥渞ight[s] to access [that] speech鈥 are in fact not the kind of everyday, 鈥渁ppropriate,鈥 and 鈥渘ecessary鈥 regulation courts can wave on by. Ante, at 13鈥18. The Constitution, contrary to what the majority at first assured us, is now very much in the picture.
At that point, one might think, the right approach 鈥 as the Court once said 鈥 鈥渟hould be clear: The standard is strict scrutiny.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Playboy, 529 U. S., at 814. Forgive a brief recap.
H. B. 1181 regulates the communicative content of websites, imposing an age verification mandate on those exhibiting a specified amount of sexually explicit speech that, while obscene for children, is protected for adults. So the law directly burdens adults鈥 right to view speech based on its sexual content. As the Court four times before found, that means strict scrutiny applies 鈥 even though the State is attempting to prevent the speech from reaching minors. See supra, at 4鈥10.
The majority tries to escape that conclusion with a maneuver found nowhere in the world of First Amendment doctrine. It turns out, the majority says, that the First Amendment only 鈥減artially protects鈥 the speech in question: The 鈥渟peech is unprotected to the extent the State seeks only to verify age.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 18, 29, n. 12 (emphasis deleted); see ante, at 28 (the speech is 鈥渦nprotected to the extent that the State imposes only an age-verification requirement鈥). Meaning, the speech is unprotected to the extent that the State is imposing the very burden under review. Or said another way, the right of adults to view the speech has the burden of age verification built right in. That is convenient, if altogether circular. In the end, the majority鈥檚 analysis reduces to this: Requiring age verification does not directly burden adults鈥 speech rights because adults have no right to be free from the burden of age verification. Gerrymander the right to incorporate the burden, and the critical conclusion follows. If only other First Amendment cases were so easy!
Still, the majority must make one more move to square the circle of all it has said. Recall that notwithstanding the above, the majority has conceded that 鈥淸a]dults have the right to access鈥 obscene-for-children speech and age verification schemes are 鈥渁 burden on the exercise of that right.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 18; see supra, at 14鈥15. To account for that concession in its analysis 鈥 and yet avoid strict scrutiny, as it wishes 鈥 the majority relies on a well-known distinction in First Amendment law between direct and incidental restrictions on speech. See (sorry) E. Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 491鈥505 (1996). Says the majority: The 鈥渂urden experienced by adults鈥 as a result of H. B. 1181 is 鈥渙nly incidental to the statute鈥檚 regulation of activity that is not protected by the First Amendment.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 18. Or more fully (prepare for a mouthful): 鈥淭he law directly regulates unprotected activity (accessing material that is obscene to minors without submitting to age verification) while only incidentally burdening protected activity (ultimately accessing that material).鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 28 (emphasis in original). And because the burden imposed on adults鈥 right to access the materials is only incidental, the majority concludes, only intermediate scrutiny need apply. To back up that view, the majority relies (exclusively) on United States v. 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). See ante, at 18鈥19, 28. 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍&苍产蝉辫;actually seems a good place to start in explaining why H. B. 1181 is not an incidental restriction under our law. In that case, a war protester who burned his draft card was charged with violating a statute that made it a crime for anyone to 鈥渒nowingly destroy[],鈥 鈥渕utilate[],鈥 or 鈥渃hange[]鈥 draft registration documents. 391 U. S., at 370 (emphasis deleted). The Court assumed that 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍 himself had engaged in expressive conduct: By burning his draft card on the steps of a government building, he was communicating opposition to the Vietnam War. See id., at 369鈥370, 376. But the law 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍 broke was not about speech; it was about conduct. That law, the Court explained, prohibited all alterations of draft cards, indifferent to whether they were 鈥減ublic [or] private,鈥 expressive or non-expressive. Id., at 375. So the 鈥渓imitation[] on [翱鈥橞谤颈别苍鈥檚] First Amendment freedoms鈥 was purely 鈥渋ncidental.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 376. And because that was so 鈥 because the statute at issue addressed only the 鈥渘oncommunicative aspect鈥 of what 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍 did 鈥 the Court decided to apply intermediate scrutiny. Id., at 381鈥382.
In the years since, this Court has used the 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍&苍产蝉辫;view of incidental restrictions in several analytically identical cases 鈥 when a limitation on conduct, 鈥渉aving no connection with speech,鈥 happens to sweep in a person鈥檚 expressive act. Id., at 375. In one, the National Park Service invoked a regulation that banned camping (defined to include sleeping) in designated parks to prevent a sleep-in demonstration about homelessness. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 289鈥291 (1984). The Court applied the 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍&苍产蝉辫;standard and approved the Park Service鈥檚 action. In another, a law against 鈥渞eenter[ing] a military base after having been barred by the commanding officer鈥 was used to charge a person who had reentered a base to participate in a political demonstration. United States v. Albertini, 472 U. S. 675, 677鈥678 (1985). We upheld the conviction under 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍. And in a third, the question was whether a law banning public nudity could be applied to an establishment featuring 鈥渆xpressive鈥 nude dancing. Erie v. Pap鈥檚 A. M., 529 U. S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion). Once again, we understood the case as in the 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍&苍产蝉辫;line, because a prohibition of conduct had an 鈥渋ncidental鈥 effect on an expressive act. 529 U. S., at 294鈥295, 301. So we used the 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍&苍产蝉辫;standard, and approved the nudity ban鈥檚 application.
None of this has any bearing on H. B. 1181. That statute is not a regulation of conduct that just so happens, on occasion, to impinge on expressive activity. It is instead a direct regulation of speech, triggered by the amount of sexually explicit expression on a commercial website. Or said a bit differently: Rather than address the 鈥渘oncommunicative鈥 aspects of an activity 鈥 as all the laws described above did 鈥 H. B. 1181 regulates (and regulates only) what no one here disputes are communicative messages. 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍, 391 U. S., at 382. Consider: a law about altering draft certificates; a law about sleeping in parks; a law about reentering military bases; a law about public nudity; a law about sexually explicit postings on websites. Which one of those laws is not like the others? As to the first four laws, the regulation is of conduct, and the burden on expression a rare knock-on effect. As to the fifth, the regulation is of speech, and the burden on that speech the very thing the statute does. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 27 (2010) (noting that 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍&苍产蝉辫;applies only when the 鈥渢hing actually at issue鈥 is 鈥渃onduct鈥). The burden H. B. 1181 imposes, of course, raises constitutional concerns only for adults. But that fact does not make the law any less a direct, not incidental, restriction on protected expression. H. B. 1181 targets communicative content, and that alone 鈥 restricting adults鈥 access to speech because of what it portrays, rather than because of any non-communicative element that it possesses.
And this Court, in four prior cases involving similar regulations enacted for similar reasons, has not once proposed an analogy to 翱鈥橞谤颈别苍. Forgive another brief recap. See supra, at 7鈥10. In all of those cases, States burdened protected speech for adults as a way of cutting off children鈥檚 access to the expression. Two of those efforts involved internet speech. The same two made liability for infractions turn on whether the publisher of the speech used an age verification measure. One of them 鈥 Ashcroft 鈥 defined the regulated speech identically to H. B. 1181 (using the Miller test adapted for minors). Yet in none of the four cases did even a single Justice float the idea that, because the restriction was geared toward protecting minors or involved age verification, the statute somehow effected only an incidental restriction. In every one, it was common ground (even among the dissenting Justices) that the statute鈥檚 restriction on adults鈥 access to speech was direct. So our precedents stand as an embarrassment to the majority鈥檚 reasoning.
The majority鈥檚 primary 鈥 and deficient 鈥 response is that those cases involved 鈥渙utright bans鈥 on speech, whereas this one involves only a burden. Ante, at 25; see ante, at 21鈥25. To begin with, that assertion is factually inaccurate as to three of the four. In Playboy, the law did not ban adult cable channels, but instead limited their transmission to hours when children were unlikely to be in the audience. See 529 U. S., at 806, 812. (The allowable hours were 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. 鈥 when, the District Court found, between 50% and 70% of adult viewing occurs anyway. See ibid.) So as the Court took care to explain, the statute did 鈥渘ot impose a complete prohibition.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 812. Rather, it effected only a 鈥渃ontent-based burden[]鈥 鈥 as H. B. 1181 does. Ibid.[3] The same is true of the statutes in Reno and Ashcroft, and in a way even more similar to Texas鈥檚 law. Recall that under those statutes, publishers using age verification measures had an affirmative defense to all liability. See supra, at 7鈥9. So as long as those measures were in place, publishers could confidently press send on whatever sexual content they wanted to transmit. The majority argues that H. B. 1181 is yet more protective of publishers, because it turns the affirmative defense into an element 鈥 putting the burden on the State to show the absence of age verification measures. See ante, at 24鈥25. But in this context, the difference between an affirmative defense and an element is but a smidge: It will matter only when a jury thinks the presence (or absence) of age verification is a literal toss-up (which in the real world will be rare). And even if the difference is more than I think, it is one between two points on a continuum 鈥 not (as the majority insists) the dividing line between a 鈥渂an鈥 and a 鈥渂urden鈥 on speech.
Much more important, the distinction between bans and burdens makes no difference to the level of scrutiny. When a statute draws lines based on the content of speech, strict scrutiny is required regardless of the amount of speech affected. Playboy made that point, in this context, at some length. 鈥It is of no moment鈥 to the level of scrutiny, the Court stated, that a law restricting speech 鈥渄oes not impose a complete prohibition.鈥 529 U. S., at 812 (emphasis added). And if that weren鈥檛 clear enough: 鈥淭he Government鈥檚 content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ibid. And if that weren鈥檛 clear enough: When a statute regulates expressive content, no 鈥渟pecial consideration鈥 is given to the government 鈥渕erely because the law can somehow be described as a burden rather than outright suppression.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Id., at 826. What鈥檚 more, Playboy is not alone in repudiating the majority鈥檚 reasoning. The refusal to countenance the ban/burden line the majority today peddles is fundamental to our free speech doctrine. Take any subject 鈥 say, because it is close to home, the Supreme Court. Ban speech about the Court; tax speech about the Court ($20 a pop); limit speech about the Court to certain times (Tuesdays and Thursdays); or (as here) demand identification to gain access to websites addressing the Court. Ban or burden, the level of scrutiny is the same: strict. See, e.g., Turner, 512 U. S., at 642 (stating the rule); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 565鈥566 (2011) (same); see also, e.g., Reed, 576 U. S., at 159, 172 (adhering to the rule when reviewing mere burdens); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 116 (1991) (same). So the principal distinction the majority draws between this case and the four that should control it is a non-distinction, by command of how we have always understood the First Amendment.
That leaves only the majority鈥檚 claim 鈥 again mistaken 鈥 that the internet has changed too much to follow our precedents鈥 lead. See ante, at 25鈥27. Of course technology has developed, both swiftly and surely. And that fact might matter (as indeed the burden/ban distinction might) to how strict scrutiny applies 鈥 and particularly to whether the State can show it has adopted the least speech-restrictive means to achieve its goal. Ashcroft explicitly recognized that point: It thought that, given the pace of technological change, the District Court might make a different decision than it had five years earlier about whether there were 鈥渓ess restrictive alternative[s]鈥 to COPA. 542 U. S., at 671鈥672. To that extent 鈥 but to that extent only 鈥 the majority is right that Ashcroft was 鈥渟elf-consciously narrow and factbound.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 26. Not, though, as to the level of scrutiny. On that question, the Court was unequivocal that because COPA was 鈥渁 content-based speech restriction,鈥 it must satisfy the strict-scrutiny test. 542 U. S., at 665; see supra, at 8鈥9, and n. 1. For that was a matter of basic First Amendment principle. And as this Court has understood: 鈥淲hatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, the basic principles of the First Amendment do not vary.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U. S. 707, 733 (2024) (quoting Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 564 U. S. 786, 790 (2011)); see TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U. S. , (2025) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 2) (鈥淸E]ven as times and technologies change, 鈥榯he principle of the right to free speech is always the same鈥欌 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))). Except that those basic principles do vary today.
III
The last part of the majority鈥檚 opinion 鈥 plus some of its footnotes 鈥 shows why all this matters. In concluding that H. B. 1181 passes constitutional muster, the majority states (correctly) that under intermediate scrutiny Texas need not show it has selected the least speech-restrictive way of accomplishing its goal. See ante, at 32. Even if there were a mechanism that (1) as well or better prevented minors鈥 access to the covered materials and (2) imposed a lesser burden on adults鈥 ability to view that expression, Texas could spurn that 鈥渟uperior鈥 method. Ante, at 34. Likewise, the majority 鈥 because it is applying a more forgiving standard 鈥 can ignore a host of questions about how far H. B. 1181 burdens protected expression. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 67鈥68. In the fine print of two footnotes, the majority declares that it has no need to explore (1) whether H. B. 1181 requires covered websites to demand age verification for all their content or only for the subset that is obscene for minors; (2) whether H. B. 1181 requires that covered speech be obscene 鈥渙nly to a minor (including a toddler)鈥 or 鈥渢o all minors (including 17-year-olds)鈥; and
(3) whether H. B. 1181 permits websites to use 鈥渘ewer biometric methods of age verification, like face scans,鈥 that pose fewer privacy concerns than submitting government ID and transactional data. Ante, at 17, n. 7 (emphasis in original); ante, at 34, n. 14. The majority explains that even if Texas answered each of those questions in a maximally burdensome way 鈥 requiring government ID to view speech that is protected even for children because one-third of the website鈥檚 contents are obscene for two-year-olds 鈥 H. B. 1181 can go forward. And again, that is true even if Texas has a less burdensome way of 鈥渆qually or more effective[ly]鈥 achieving its objective. Ante, at 34.
I would demand Texas show more, to ensure it is not undervaluing the interest in free expression. Texas can of course take measures to prevent minors from viewing obscene-for-children speech. But if a scheme other than H. B. 1181 can just as well accomplish that objective and better protect adults鈥 First Amendment freedoms, then Texas should have to adopt it (or at least demonstrate some good reason not to). A State may not care much about safeguarding adults鈥 access to sexually explicit speech; a State may even prefer to curtail those materials for everyone. Many reasonable people, after all, view the speech at issue here as ugly and harmful for any audience. But the First Amendment protects those sexually explicit materials, for every adult. So a State cannot target that expression, as Texas has here, any more than is necessary to prevent it from reaching children. That is what we have held in cases indistinguishable from this one. And that is what foundational First Amendment principles demand. Because the majority departs from that right and settled law, I respectfully dissent.
Notes
[1] The majority does 鈥 and then does not 鈥 accept this simple fact. It first acknowledges that Ashcroft decided 鈥淐OPA was subject to strict scrutiny.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 12. But later, it tries to take part of its concession back. The Ashcroft Court, it says, could not have 鈥渃omprehensive[ly]鈥 addressed the 鈥渁ppropriate standard of scrutiny for laws protecting children from sexual content online, given that the appropriate standard was not even a contested issue in the case.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 26. The second half of that sentence is right, but it does not support the first. Having argued in Sable, Reno, and Playboy for a less rigorous standard of review 鈥 and been rebuffed each time 鈥 the Government in Ashcroft finally gave up. Or otherwise said, it recognized reality. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 64. Three times before, the Court had said something like, 鈥淸T]he answer should be clear: The standard is strict scrutiny.鈥&苍产蝉辫;United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 814 (2000). The Court did so again, and just as firmly, in Ashcroft.
[2] The majority acknowledges that Ginsberg itself never addressed whether, or what kind of, constitutional scrutiny is appropriate for age verification laws applying to speech. See ante, at 22, 31鈥32. The many cites to Ginsberg in the majority opinion function mainly as atmosphere, to remind the reader that age verification mandates may impose only a trivial burden on speech rights. See ante, at 15鈥16, 19鈥22, 30. Which of course is true 鈥 just as it is true that they may impose a significant one. See ante, at 31; supra, at 5鈥6.
[3] The majority does not know what to do with the Playboy Court鈥檚 description, so merely asserts that channeling adult programming to evening hours is a 鈥渂an[ ].鈥&苍产蝉辫;Ante, at 22, n. 9. But why? If a park鈥檚 hours were limited to between 9 a.m. and 9 p.m., is there really a 鈥渂an鈥 on entering the park? Does it matter when people typically use the park 鈥 or watch adult programming? If so, where is the tipping point? Questions like these may not have easy answers (which is one good reason not to make too much ride on the ban/burden line, see infra, at 20鈥21). But the important point here is that Playboy understood the statute before it as imposing only a burden, not a ban 鈥 and still applied strict scrutiny. So its analysis 鈥 not its 鈥渄icta,鈥 but its so-called ratio decidendi 鈥 refutes the majority鈥檚 position. Ante, at 22, n. 9.